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Free Trade Agreements and the 
Consolidation of Democracy†
By Xuepeng Liu and Emanuel Ornelas*
We study the relationship between participation in free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) and the sustainability of democracy. Our model shows 
that FTAs can critically reduce the incentive of authoritarian groups 
to seek power by destroying protectionist rents, thus making democ-
racies last longer. This gives governments in unstable democracies 
an extra motive to form FTAs. Hence, greater democratic instability 
induces governments to boost their FTA commitments. In a data-
set with 116 countries over 1960–2007, we find robust support for 
these predictions. They help to rationalize the rapid simultaneous 
growth of regionalism and of worldwide democratization since the 
late 1980s. (JEL D72, F13, F15, O19, O24)
“Striking down trade barriers is critical to sustaining democracy […] 
throughout the region.”
— Former US President George W. Bush at the 2001 summit of the 
potential signatories of the Free Trade Area of the Americas  (New York Times, 4/18/2001)
When the United States formally announced the intention to pursue a free trade agreement with Central American countries, one explicit goal was “to sup-
port democracy” in the region (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2002/01/20020116-11.html). Indeed, the establishment of new democracies 
has often been followed by the formation of preferential arrangements (or the acces-
sion to existing ones). This was the case, for example, of all Mercosur members, of 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain in their accessions to the European Community, and of 
the European Union (EU) agreements with Central and Eastern Europe countries 
shortly after the fall of the iron curtain. It is therefore not too surprising that govern-
ments regularly report to the World Trade Organization that “promoting democracy 
and political stability” is a central force behind their decisions to form regional trade 
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agreements (World Trade Organization 2011). Of course, this may be mere rhetoric. 
But maybe not.
In this paper, we develop a coherent theoretical mechanism linking participation 
in free trade agreements (FTAs) and democratic consolidation. We then scrutinize it 
empirically. We argue that participation in FTAs can serve as a commitment device 
to destroy future protectionist rents. Since such rents are attractive to autocratic 
groups, FTAs lower their incentives to seek power. While this has little value in 
established democracies, where the rule of law is strong and the authoritarian threat 
is negligible, it matters for unstable democracies. Some states will therefore have an 
extra incentive to seek involvement in FTAs, over and above the agreements’ pos-
sible trade gains.
We provide the theoretical basis for our claims by extending the preferential trade 
integration model developed by Ornelas (2005a) to allow for endogenous changes 
in the political regime.1 In that model, under any trade regime, domestic firms 
exchange transfers for protection with the government. The government decides 
whether to form an FTA considering the political economy equilibrium under each 
trade regime. The key to understand the impact of an FTA is the recognition that 
the equilibrium of the (ex post) external tariff game changes under the constraint 
imposed by the agreement on the internal tariffs. Once one takes this into account, 
and only then, one finds that even though FTAs still permit lobbying for protection 
against excluded countries, the volume of protectionist rents falls with the formation 
of an agreement.
In a dynamic setting this implies that, all else equal, groups motivated mainly by 
rents will have lower incentives to seek power if the country is deeply engaged in 
FTAs and withdrawal from the agreement is costly. Authoritarian groups tend to fit 
this description well.2 If the gain of authoritarian groups from seeking power falls 
when the country is engaged in FTAs, but the agreement does not alter the costs and 
risks from attempting a coup d’état, the likelihood of democratic failure will, all else 
being equal, be lower if the country is more intensively involved in FTAs. Hence, 
greater participation in FTAs increases the likelihood of democracy survival.
If the incumbent government in an unstable democracy realizes this effect of 
“democratic consolidation,” it will seek participation in FTAs more actively than it 
otherwise would, in order to weaken the authoritarian threat. Yet even if the dictato-
rial group takes control despite the FTA, the agreement would still constrain its rent-
extraction activities. For both of these reasons, unstable democracies tend to enter 
into FTAs more frequently than stable ones.
Analyzing the formation of FTAs and the strength of democracy in 116 coun-
tries over the period 1960–2007, we obtain empirical support for both of our main 
theoretical results. Employing duration analysis techniques, we find that greater 
1 To our knowledge, McLaren (2000) provides the only other theoretical analysis of how political turnover 
affects governments’ decisions to participate in trade agreements. However, his emphasis is very different, on the 
choice between free trade areas and customs unions.
2 In our analysis, we do not take a stance on whether democratic or authoritarian regimes are more rent-seeking. 
We nevertheless note that, at least in the trade context, authoritarian regimes are more often associated with rent-
creating policies (see e.g., Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000; Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubas¸o ˘   glu 2002; and 
Aidt and Gassebner 2010).
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 participation in FTAs lowers the likelihood of democracy failure in a country. Using 
the estimated hazard rates from the duration analysis, but considering only the por-
tion of the  likelihood that is not predicted by current FTA participation, we find 
that a higher risk of democratic breakdown induces countries to participate more 
actively in FTAs. Our empirical results are robust to many different econometric 
specifications, alternative measures of democratic transition and different sets of 
controls. They are also economically meaningful.
One of our empirical challenges is to define how unstable a democracy is. We 
do so by relying on the approach proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2009), who 
estimate the likelihood of democracy failure employing the concept of “demo-
cratic capital.” The domestic component of democratic capital reflects the history 
of democracy in the country. The foreign component of democratic capital instead 
encompasses current levels of democracy abroad. Along with other covariates, 
these two components of democratic capital allow us to estimate the likelihood 
of democracy failure in a country.
A concern is that FTA participation may be endogenous in the estimation of 
democracy longevity. Indeed, our second hypothesis implies a positive relation-
ship between democracy instability and formation of new FTAs. From this view, 
the endogeneity bias would imply a positive relationship between FTA partici-
pation and democracy instability, suggesting that the negative relationship we 
obtain is a lower bound (in absolute value) for the true effect. We nevertheless 
propose an instrumental variable estimation that relies on “contagion” effects in 
FTA formation that follows a reasoning advanced by Egger and Larch (2008) and 
Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012). The main idea is that, when its neighbors engage 
more deeply in FTAs, a country tends to follow suit. We confirm that contagion 
measures are indeed strong instruments for FTA participation. Moreover, our 
finding that more intense FTA participation increases the longevity of democra-
cies is not altered when we use this approach.
Interestingly, our predictions hold consistently for full-fledged agreements 
signed under the Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), but not for partial-scope preferential trade agreements signed under the 
Enabling Clause of the GATT.3 These stark differential results are consistent with 
the rent-destructing mechanism we put forward, as the partial-scope arrange-
ments, unlike those signed under Article XXIV, impose very few restrictions on 
the availability of rents from protection.4
To our knowledge, Pevehouse (2005) is the only other to relate participation in 
trade agreements, as well as in other international organizations, to the durability 
of democracy. He argues that, because of signaling effects, joining an international 
organization increases the longevity of new democracies when the organization has 
high “democratic density.” Following Pevehouse, we test whether the role of an FTA 
in helping to sustain a country’s democracy is greater when the agreement is with 
3 Article XXIV requires free trade agreements to cover most of the trade among the members and that members 
liberalize fully vis-à-vis each other; the Enabling Clause permits numerous exceptions to those rules.
4 This relates to the findings of Mrázová, Vines, and Zissimos (2013), who show that Article XXIV can have 
important welfare implications.
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more democratic partners. We find no such differential effects. Thus, pressure from 
more democratic FTA partners is not what drives our results.
Our second finding is also novel, but relates to other previous results. Mansfield, 
Milner and Rosendorff (2002) find that pairs of democratic countries are more likely 
to share a trade agreement than pairs in which at least one country has an authori-
tarian political regime.5 We take Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff’s (2002) find-
ing on board and focus on democracies. We then dig deeper to understand whether 
democracies at different stages in their “consolidation” process have different incen-
tives to engage in FTAs. We find that they do. Among democracies, those who face 
threats to their democratic regimes are especially prone to form FTAs.
Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) also distinguish between different types of 
democracies and their willingness to join international organizations. They find that 
countries that have undergone recent transitions to democracy are more likely to 
join international organizations. Two central differences between the findings of 
Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) and our second main result are worth stressing. 
First, we explicitly estimate each country’s hazard out of democracy. Second, we do 
not pool all types of international organizations. This matters, as we find a strong 
effect of democratic instability on FTA participation but not on participation in par-
tial-scope trade agreements.
Our broader argument is related to the commitment rationale for trade agree-
ments espoused by Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998, 2007), although in their 
analyses a government enters a free trade agreement not to affect its successor’s 
policies, but its own (otherwise time-inconsistent) future policies. The more general 
idea that governments can manipulate state variables to constrain their successors’ 
choices was first advanced in the macroeconomics political economy literature.6 
More recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have developed a framework to 
study circumstances when an incumbent democratic government can design policies 
to irreversibly change the expected net benefit of future coups.7 A related reasoning 
is employed here to show that a democratic government facing the prospect of polit-
ical disruption may want to limit the ability of a potential authoritarian government 
to create rents through trade policies. We innovate in this dimension by showing, 
theoretically and empirically, that an FTA can be an effective tool for that purpose.8
There is also an important line of research that links democracy to trade lib-
eralization and openness.9 The forces typically emphasized in that literature are, 
5 Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse (2008) find that this holds for different types of trade agreements except the 
“shallowest” ones, according to a five-tier classification. Roy (2011) takes a distinct perspective, showing that the 
breadth of the service commitments undertaken by WTO members is greater for more democratic countries.
6 See e.g., the pioneering contributions by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989).
7 They demonstrate, for example, how trade and capital account liberalization reduce equilibrium taxation under 
democracy, while also rendering coups more costly through the impact of openness on factor prices.
8 This contrasts with an alternative (and rather ubiquitous) view in the trade literature that regards FTAs as 
rent-creating devices (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1995). See Freund and Ornelas (2010) for a discussion of that 
literature.
9 See, for example, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), O’Rourke and Taylor (2007), López-Córdova and Meissner 
(2008), and Stroup and Zissimos (2012). There is, of course, also a vast literature on the determinants of democ-
racy and of its durability. See Barro (1999) for a classic reference for the former and Przeworski et al. (1996) for 
the latter. Gassebner, Lamla and Vreeland (2013) provide empirical scrutiny of many factors that could affect the 
survival of democracies.
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 however, quite different from the mechanism we advance here. Moreover, we focus 
on the role of trade agreements, where an external commitment makes the policy 
costly enough to reverse so that it can credibly affect the actions of future govern-
ments.10 A unilateral tariff reduction would not fulfill this requirement.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I we describe the model. In Section II 
we analyze the incentives to form a free trade agreement. We discuss our empirical 
strategy in Section III. The data are described in Section IV. We show our empirical 
results in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
I. The Model
Our theoretical framework extends the model of Ornelas (2005a) to a simple 
dynamic setting where an incumbent democratic government faces an authoritarian 
threat. The basic structure of the model and its static results are therefore just like 
those in Ornelas (2005a). We describe its structure and key results succinctly in 
subsections IIA to IIC to keep the paper self-contained.
A. The Economic Structure
We consider a three-country, N-sector competitive economy where in each sec-
tor there is a “natural importer” country that would import the good from the other 
two countries under free trade. Goods are produced under constant returns to scale. 
One unit of the numéraire good 0 is produced with one unit of labor. All other goods 
j = 1, … , N − 1 are produced with labor and a sector-specific factor. Thus, when-
ever good 0 is produced in equilibrium, which we assume to be the case, the wage 
rate equals unity and general equilibrium forces are absorbed by that sector.
The analysis is conducted from the perspective of a “Home” country. 
Home’s population consists of a continuum of agents with measure one. Each 
agent is endowed with one unit of labor, whereas specific factors are owned 
by a negligible fraction of the population. Consumers have quasi-linear utility 
u =  q 0 +  ∑ j = 1 N−1  [ A q  j − ( q  j ) 2 /2 ] , which generates demand  D  j = A −  p  j for good j.
Home is the natural importer of goods m = 1, … , M, country Y is the natural 
importer of a subset E of different goods, and country Z is the natural importer of 
the remaining (N − M − E − 1) nonnuméraire products. Home’s owners of the 
specific factor used in sector j earn  π  j (  p  j ), where  p  j denotes the price of good j in 
Home’s market. In the nonnuméraire sectors, the domestic supply of each imported 
good m is  S  m (  p m ) =  d  m  p m and the supply of each exported good x is  S  x (  p  x ) =  d  x  p  x , 
where  d  x >  d  m > 0. An analogous specification applies for the supply and demand 
structures of countries Y and Z. Home can use specific import tariffs in each import 
sector; other policy instruments are assumed unavailable. We represent Home’s tar-
iff on imports from country j by  t j , j = Y, Z. Because all import sectors are identical, 
we will write prices and tariffs without sector-identifying superscripts.
10 See Bagwell and Staiger (2004, 2010) for a discussion of this and other roles of trade agreements.
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Prices for each product in the three countries are linked by arbitrage conditions. 
Market-clearing and the arbitrary conditions link equilibrium prices to tariffs. When 
Home is not a member of a free trade agreement, it follows GATT’s requirement of 
nondiscrimination. When Home is in an FTA, imports from the FTA partner are duty 
free, but imports from the excluded country remain taxed, although the country’s 
optimal external tariff will in general change as a result of the FTA.
B. The Political Structure
We consider that any group represented in the government enjoys power because 
there are rents for holding office, as in models like Besley and Coate’s (2001). The 
sources of those rents are transfers/bribes, which the private sector offers to gov-
ernment officials in exchange for more favorable policies. Policymakers also care 
about national welfare. Numerous reasons can explain this concern. Since modeling 
the precise way in which policymakers form their preferences is not essential for 
our analysis, we take an agnostic view, and simply assume that whoever is in power 
sets policy, considering both its welfare consequences and its capacity to attract 
transfers.
Let us define the measures of welfare. Welfare generated in a specific- factor import 
sector is denoted by  W  m (t), whereas  W  x represents welfare from a  specific-factor export 
sector. The former is defined as the sum of consumers’ surplus, tariff revenue, and 
producers’ surplus generated in that sector; the latter is defined as the sum of consum-
ers’ and producers’ surplus in the sector. Welfare aggregated across all nonnuméraire 
import and export sectors is then  W  M (t) ≡ M W  m (t) and  W  X ≡ (N − M − 1) W  x , 
respectively.11 National welfare, W(t), aggregates welfare across all sectors:








  W  x .
The preference of the government is specified as








  G x ,
with  G  x ≡  W  x and
(1′ )   G  m (t, T   m ) ≡  W  m (t) + b T   m ,
where  T   m denotes the transfer from import-competing sector m to the government, 
T ≡  ∑ m = 1 M  T   m , and b > 0 reflects the “rent-seeking bias” of the government, or 
how susceptible to bribes/transfers its policies are.
11 Note that we denote welfare in import-competing sectors as a function of the tariff, but not in export sectors, 
because  W  x depends only on the tariffs imposed by foreign countries Y and Z. Since those tariffs are given from the 
perspective of the Home government under any trade regime, we employ this more concise representation.
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The government sets policy according to (1) regardless of its nature, demo-
cratic or not. We adopt this assumption not because we believe that both types of 
 governments implement identical policies, but because our main results do not 
depend on this distinction, and we have nothing to add to the (extensive) debate on 
whether democracies or autocracies are more rent-seeking.12 We also abstract from 
domestic political competition. Nevertheless, one can reinterpret the government’s 
payoff as an expected payoff (taking into account the probability of being voted out 
of power). Ultimately, what is essential is that the rents from holding office depend 
on the policies implemented.
Because of the symmetry and independence across sectors, we focus on a single 
import-competing sector. The net payoff of producers in such a sector corresponds 
to the industry’s aggregate profits,  π  m (t), subtracted of the transfers it gives to the 
local government,  T   m .
As in Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998), we model the interaction between gov-
ernment and each domestic industry as a Nash bargaining game, where each side 
obtains half of the total surplus from the negotiation process.13 Under the Nash 
bargaining protocol, the outcome of the bargaining process is jointly efficient. Thus, 
the “political tariff” resulting from this interaction satisfies
(2)  t   p = arg max[ W  m (t) + b π  m (t)],
where the term in brackets represents (up to a constant) the joint payoff of the 
government and the industry in a representative import-competing sector. We 
concentrate on the case where the solution to problem (2) is interior. This corresponds 
to assuming that b <  b max ≡ (1 +  d  m )( d  x −  d  m )/(1 +  d  x ) d  m .
C. Equilibrium Payoffs
If the private sector were able to capture the entire surplus from lobbying, it 
would only need to compensate the government for the distortions that  t  p creates. In 
that case, the government would obtain its reservation payoff, which is equivalent 
to how much it would get by setting tariffs to maximize national welfare, yielding a 
payoff from each import-competing sector of  W  m ( t  p (b = 0)), or simply  W  m (b = 0). 
This would require a transfer from each lobby of [ W  m (b = 0) −  W  m (b)]/b, where 
W  m (b) ≡  W  m ( t  p (b)). Conversely, if the government could retain the whole surplus 
from lobbying, producers from each import-competing industry m would earn 
only their reservation payoff of  π  m (b = 0) ≡  π  m ( t  p (b = 0)), entailing a transfer of 
[ π  m (b) −  π  m (b = 0)] to the government. Since government and domestic industry 
split the surplus from lobbying, the equilibrium transfer from each industry to the 
12 Grossman and Helpman (1996) provide microfoundations for the weights in equation  ( 1 ′  ) , but in a model 
of electoral competition, whereas our context is one where a potential autocrat considers taking over the country, 
not through the ballot box but through force. Dixit (2010) provides a nuanced general discussion of rent-seeking 
behavior in democracies and autocracies.
13 One may want to distinguish the bargaining power of the government relative to the domestic industries based 
on whether it is democratic or autocratic, for example, because the forces limiting rent-seeking behavior may be 
weaker in dictatorships due to less accountability. Since this has no bearing on our results, we take the simpler route 
of assuming that government and private sector always split the surplus from lobbying.
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government is instead  T   m = [ π  m (b) −  π  m (b = 0)]/2 + [ W  m (b = 0) −  W  m (b)]/2b. 
Hence, in equilibrium the government obtains from each nonnuméraire import-
competing sector a payoff of
(3)  G  m =  W  m (b) + b T   m (b)
 =  W  m (b) + b  {  1 _ 2 [  π  m (b) −  π  m (b = 0) ] +  1 _ 2b [  W  m (b = 0) −  W  m (b) ] } .
There is a more intuitive way of representing this expression. First, define the 
“political rents” created in the lobbying process in each nonnuméraire import- 
competing sector as
(4) P r  m ≡  [ W  m (b) + b π  m (b) ] −  [ W  m (b = 0) + b π  m (b = 0) ] .
The expression in the first set of brackets of (4) is the maximized joint payoff of 
the government and the industry, while the expression in the second set of brackets 
is the value of the same function in the absence of lobbying. The difference between 
them represents the surplus that the lobbying process adds to the joint payoff of gov-
ernment and industry. From (3) and (4) we can see that, in equilibrium, the govern-
ment obtains its reservation payoff in the sector plus its share of the political rents:
(5)  G  m =  W  m (b = 0) +  P r  m  _
2
  .
Aggregating across all sectors, we can write (1) evaluated at the equilibrium as
(6) G ≡ G( t  p ,T ) =  W  M (b = 0) +  W  X +  Pr _
2
  ,
where Pr ≡  ∑ m = 1 M P r  m . Hence, the government obtains in equilibrium its 
reservation utility, [ W  M (b = 0) +  W  X ], plus its share of the political rents. This 
makes clear that the group in power does not fully internalize the welfare distortions 
due to its use of the political tariff.
In contrast, if the same political group were out of power, its payoff would be dif-
ferent even if the tariff were the same. The reason is that the group does not receive 
any rents if it is not in a position to enact policies. Accordingly, in that case the group 
would receive none of the available office rents, and its equilibrium payoff H would 
reflect only the general state of the economy:
(7) H ≡ G( t  p ,0) =  W  M (b) +  W  X .
The benefits from holding office correspond to the difference between (6) and 
(7), which is positive because  W  M (b = 0) ≥  W  M (b) and Pr ≥ 0.
D. coup Threat
We consider a simple 2-period environment. Agents discount future payoffs 
according to discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1]. In the first period there is a democratically 
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elected government in power. There is also a group of citizens that represent a seg-
ment of the population not in the government, which may attempt to take power 
through force. There is an exogenous probability that they will have this opportu-
nity. We are agnostic about the identity of the citizens represented by this group; 
it could be the military, a group of capitalists, or the upper class, etc. In any case, 
if a coup is attempted and is successful, the authoritarian group takes power in the 
second period.
Naturally, numerous factors affect both the possibility of initiating a coup and its 
probability of success. For example, both tend to be higher the stronger the “sup-
port” of the citizens who favor the coup and the weaker the “resistance” from the 
segments of the population opposed to the coup.14 We do not model these probabili-
ties, because quantifying those forces would be remarkably difficult. We highlight, 
however, that they are likely to be strongly (negatively) affected by the country’s 
stock of “democratic capital” (Dc). The notion of democratic capital, introduced by 
Persson and Tabellini (2009), proxies the strength of the country’s democratic insti-
tutions. Thus, it provides a useful and concise way of capturing several forces high-
lighted in the voluminous literature on the durability of democracies. Specifically, 
in the definition of Persson and Tabellini, the current stock of Dc in a country is 
determined by both the level of democracy in the country’s neighbors and by the 
country’s democratic history. They reason that in nations with enduring democratic 
tradition, where the rule of law is strong, democratic capital will be abundant and 
significantly limit the possibility of political disruption. Conversely, in countries 
lacking solid institutions, where the rule of law is weak, democratic capital will be 
scarce, thus opening a tangible opportunity for successful coups. Since the level of 
democratic capital in a country can be considered exogenous (or at least predeter-
mined) to the relevant political groups, we will rely on it in our empirical analysis.
We model the authoritarian group’s problem as simply as possible. We assume 
that, if the takeover attempt is successful, the authoritarian group imposes an auto-
cratic regime in the country and obtains its office payoff G in the second period. If 
the takeover attempt is unsuccessful, the group bears a fixed cost K > 0.15 The prob-
ability of success of the coup is denoted by ρ.
Therefore, when a coup is attempted, the present value payoffs of the incumbent 
and of the authoritarian group are represented, respectively, by
(8)  Γ  D = G + δ[(1 − ρ)G + ρH ],
(9)  Γ  A = H + δ[(1 − ρ)(H − K) + ρG ].
If no coup were attempted, the incumbent government and the authoritarian group 
receive, respectively, G and H in each period.
14 See, for example, the insightful discussion by Brender and Drazen (2009) on how the effectiveness of policies 
to consolidate democracies depends on the strength of the public support for the democratic regime.
15  Parameter K provides a proxy for the many kinds of penalties that could apply in such a case: incarceration, 
extradition, death, and the like.
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Thus, the (risk-neutral) authoritarian group attempts to take power if and only if 
the expected utility from the endeavor is positive:  Γ  A > (1 + δ )H. Using (9), this 
condition is equivalent to
(10) ρ(G − H) > (1 − ρ)K.
That is, provided that it can initiate a coup, the authoritarian group will attempt to 
take power if its expected gain from seeking power is large relative to the expected 
cost of a failed coup. To make explicit what is behind this decision, we use expres-
sions (6) and (7) to rewrite condition (10) as
(11)  [  W  M (b = 0) −  W  M (b) ] +  Pr _
2
  >  1 − ρ(Dc) _ρ(Dc)  K.
In a consolidated democracy, where democratic capital is very high, an attempt 
against the county’s democratic system is unlikely, unless the costs of failure are too 
low—which is rarely the case—or the gains from holding power are very signifi-
cant. Our central goal is to analyze how a free trade agreement affects the latter, and 
through that channel the endurance of democracy in a country.
Naturally, an FTA can be used to affect future policies only if its reversal is costly 
enough to inhibit future governments from reversing the arrangement. While here 
we simply assume that FTAs are irreversible, it would be relatively straightforward 
to extend the current model so that irreversibility becomes an equilibrium result, 
e.g., by relying on McLaren’s (2002) notion that governments incur in “negotiat-
ing costs” when forming (or withdrawing from) FTAs. Ultimately, FTAs matter for 
commitment as long as there is a nontrivial cost to reverse them.16
It is also important to clarify that, although we consider a discrete-time problem, 
one should think of this as a continuous-time problem, where the realization of a 
coup depends on both exogenous (e.g., the state of the world economy) and endog-
enous (e.g., effort spent on coordination) factors. The point we develop below is 
that the latter is affected by policies such as the formation of an FTA. We keep the 
two-period modeling only for expositional reasons.
II. The Decision to Form a Free Trade Agreement
A free trade agreement between two countries is represented by the elimination 
of tariffs on each other’s imports in all sectors included in the agreement. Thus, the 
equilibrium under an FTA is analogous to the one described in Section II, the only 
difference being the constraint imposed on some (potentially all) of the partners’ 
reciprocal import tariffs. Without loss of generality, we let Home’s potential FTA 
partner be country Y.
16 Irreversibility is also coherent with history, as preferential trading arrangements de facto implemented are 
seldom turned down later on. Even in the rather rare circumstances when authoritarian regimes gained control of 
a country that participated in an effective trade agreement, the arrangement is usually honored, as, for example, in 
Swaziland, a member of SACU.
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An FTA can be implemented by the incumbent government for reasons related or 
unrelated to the authoritarian threat. There are four possibilities. First, the country 
may already be a consolidated democracy, in the sense that condition (15) holds 
neither with nor without FTAs. This is the standard case considered in the regional-
ism literature, and it is not our goal to analyze it further here. Rather, we focus on 
situations where FTAs can be formed for “strategic” reasons.
The second possibility is that the country’s democracy is so fragile that  condition (15) 
is satisfied whether or not there is an FTA in place. In that case, while an FTA cannot 
be used to prevent a coup, the possibility of losing power can affect the incentives of 
the incumbent government with respect to the formation of the agreement. Finally, it is 
possible that an FTA affects (in either direction) the expected payoff of the authoritar-
ian group and, as a result, its incentives to attempt to take power.
Before starting our analysis, we need to describe the effects of an FTA on the 
level of available political rents and the role of parameter b in shaping its welfare 
effects. These results set the basis for the analysis of the political viability of FTAs.
A. The rent Destruction Effect
Ornelas (2005a) shows that an FTA moderates the role of political economy 
forces in the determination of tariffs, and that the mitigation of the politically driven 
distortions corresponds to a source of welfare gain that is more relevant, the more 
far-reaching the government’s political economy motivations. Furthermore, an FTA 
diminishes the rents created in the lobbying process. Intuitively, because the arrange-
ment provides free access to the partner’s exporters, the market share of the domes-
tic industry shrinks, at any given external tariff. As a result, the FTA makes any price 
increase brought by a marginal increase in the external tariff less valuable for the 
import-competing industries, lowering their incentives to lobby for higher external 
tariffs. In equilibrium, these lower incentives result in a lower external tariff and in 
fewer rents for the government.17 The following lemma summarizes these effects.18
LEMMA 1: [The rent destruction effect of FTAs (Ornelas 2005a)] Everything else 
constant, an FTA:
 (i) improves Home’s welfare by more (or reduces it by less), the higher the gov-
ernment’s rent-seeking bias; and
 (ii) reduces the political rents generated in the political process.
17 There is robust empirical evidence that the formation of free trade areas in developing countries (largely the 
focus of our analysis) leads to declining external tariffs (see Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas 2008 for evidence 
from Latin America and Calvo-Pardo, Freund, and Ornelas 2011 for evidence from Southeast Asia), although the 
evidence is mixed for developed countries (see Limão 2006 and Ketterer, Bernhofen, and Milner 2013). While 
measuring protectionist rents directly is very difficult, the level of tariffs provides a good proxy for them; see Freund 
and Ornelas (2010) for a general discussion.
18 These results do not hinge on the perfectly competitive structure adopted by Ornelas (2005a), which we fol-
low here. Analogous results obtain also under oligopolistic competition (Ornelas 2005b).
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Lemma 1 allows us to analyze the conditions under which the Home government 
would choose to form an FTA.19 The decision regarding the formation of an FTA is 
based on the anticipated impact of the agreement. The government implements the 
agreement if and only if it increases the government’s present value payoff. Note 
that the effects described in Lemma 1 are larger, the greater the number of specific-
factor import-competing sectors included in the FTA.
It is worth noting that, although we abstract from direct lobbying for and against 
FTAs, adding ex ante lobbying would have little effect on the analysis, just as 
Ornelas (2005a) shows to be the case when changes in the political regime are not 
considered. Consider for example exporting sectors, the main source of support for 
FTAs. Their benefits from an FTA depend primarily on the extent of the access to 
the partners’ markets, rather than on domestic policies. Therefore, their willingness 
to support an FTA is not directly affected by who holds power.
Before analyzing how the possibility of political disruption affects the govern-
ment’s willingness to form free trade agreements, we define some useful notation. 
We henceforth attach subscript “F ” to all variables when they are evaluated under 
an FTA. We adopt subscript “ΔF ” to represent the equilibrium change in any vari-
able due to the FTA. For example,  W Δ F  x denotes the aggregate welfare change in a 
 nonnuméraire export sector due to the agreement, whereas  W Δ F m (b) and  W Δ F m (b = 0) 
denote, respectively, the aggregate welfare impact of the FTA on a nonnuméraire 
import sector and the equivalent effect under a hypothetical administration whose 
only concern is national welfare (equivalent to a situation where lobbying is effec-
tively banned). Finally, let  I  M denote the number of  specific-factor  import-competing 
sectors included in the FTA under analysis, with  I  M ≤ M. Aggregating the welfare 
impact of the agreement on both types of sectors, we then define  W Δ F M (b) ≡  I  M W ΔF m (b) 
and  W ΔF X ≡  I X W ΔF x . Analogously, P r ΔF   ≡  I  M P r ΔF m .
B. FTAs That Do Not Affect the Probability of Political Disruption
We begin analyzing the case where there is a possibility of political disruption but 
this possibility is unaffected by the existence of FTAs—that is, condition (11) holds 
regardless of FTAs.
In this case, the equilibrium payoff of the incumbent democratic government 
under the FTA corresponds to
(12)  Γ F D =  G F + δ[(1 − ρ) G F + ρ H F ].
The condition under which the democratic government supports the FTA when the 
authoritarian threat is inevitable is  Γ ΔF D ≡  Γ F D −  Γ D > 0. Using equations (8) and (12),  Γ ΔF D can be rewritten as
  Γ ΔF D =  G ΔF + δ[(1 − ρ) G ΔF + ρ H ΔF ].
19 Naturally, an FTA is formed only if all prospective members endorse it. We conduct the discussion from the 
perspective of the Home country, but an analogous analysis would apply for country Y.
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Using expressions (6) and (7) and manipulating, this expression becomes
(13)  Γ ΔF D = [1 + δ(1 − ρ)] [ W ΔF M (b = 0) +  P r ΔF    _2  ] + δρ W ΔF M (b) + (1 + δ ) W ΔF X .
Thus, the incumbent democratic government supports the FTA in this case if
(14)  [ 1 + δ(1−ρ) ] [ 2 W ΔF M (b = 0) + P r ΔF   ] + 2δρ W ΔF M (b) + 2(1 + δ ) W ΔF X > 0.
The interesting case is when the democratic government changes its stance 
toward an FTA because of the authoritarian threat. An FTA is (ordinarily) politi-
cally feasible if
(15) 2 [  W ΔF M (b = 0) +  W ΔF X ] + P r ΔF   > 0.
The next proposition shows that the authoritarian threat can make an otherwise 
politically infeasible FTA (i.e., one for which condition (15) does not hold) into a 
politically feasible one. All proofs are in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 1: Even if the authoritarian threat cannot be affected, the mere 
possibility of political disruption can turn an otherwise politically unfeasible FTA 
into a viable one. The set of parameters under which this happens increases with the 
number of Home’s specific-factor import-competing sectors included in the agree-
ment ( I  M ). By contrast, the possibility of disruption cannot render unfeasible an 
otherwise feasible FTA.
Proposition 1 shows that the possibility of political disruption can enhance the 
political feasibility of FTAs by creating a “strategic” motivation for their adoption. 
Strategically supported FTAs arise when, between conditions (14) and (15), only 
the former is satisfied, so that
(16)  Γ ΔF D (ρ = 0) ≤ 0 <  Γ ΔF D (ρ > 0).
An FTA can be implemented for strategic reasons because the democratic govern-
ment, if out of power, will not receive any of the lobbying-related rents. In that case, 
the government would benefit from an FTA because the agreement constrains the 
welfare-distorting political activities of the authoritarian group if it gets in power. 
Thus, a government that expects to lose power to a dictatorial group might seek an 
FTA simply to constrain the policies of the incoming authoritarian group. Since this 
strategic motivation is more relevant when disruption is more likely, it follows that 
“democratic instability” incites the formation of free trade agreements. 20
20 It is easy to see that this strategic motivation for signing FTAs is stronger, the greater the rent-seeking bias of 
the autocrat. This follows because the forces underlined in Lemma 1 are stronger, the higher the rent-seeking bias of 
the group setting policies. This suggests that an authoritarian threat can make strategic FTAs particularly appealing, 
since despite some disagreement, the majority of views in the literature seem to agree that autocracies tend to pursue 
particularly distortionary policies (see Dixit 2010).
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The strength of this strategic motivation to form an FTA depends on how compre-
hensive the agreement is. This is represented in the model by the number of Home’s 
import-competing sectors susceptible to lobbying that are included in the FTA,  I M . 
Intuitively, if Home imports more widely from its FTA partner in sectors where 
there is active lobbying, the agreement becomes more rent-destructing. While this 
helps the country as a whole, it is detrimental to those in office who benefit from 
those rents. Under the threat of political disruption, however, the government under-
stands that the loss of rents will likely be borne by the authoritarian group. Hence 
the destruction of rents becomes less critical in the democratic government’s evalu-
ation of the agreement.
C. FTAs That can Help Secure Democracies
The analysis above considers the case where a free trade agreement is not piv-
otal in the decision of the authoritarian group to attempt to take power through 
force. This need not be the case. Specifically, an FTA can prevent a coup from 
happening, although it cannot provoke a coup that would not occur without 
the agreement.
PROPOSITION 2: If the authoritarian group did not intend to initiate a coup 
in the absence of trade agreements, an FTA cannot induce it to initiate one. On 
the other hand, the formation of a sufficiently rent-destructing FTA can free the 
country from the authoritarian threat. This is more likely to happen, the greater 
the number of Home’s specific-factor import-competing sectors included in the 
agreement ( I M ).
Proposition 2 shows that, because of the rent-destructing effects of FTAs, 
a free trade agreement can critically reduce the incentives of the authoritar-
ian group to subvert the country’s democratic system. In this sense, an FTA 
helps to constrain the emergence of authoritarian regimes, especially if the 
bloc is significantly rent-destructing. Relying on the common notion that the 
availability of rents can entice political turbulence, the proposition’s novelty 
stems from the recognition of FTAs as instruments to restrain the gains from 
rent-seeking behavior.
Recall that Proposition 1 asserts that the possibility of political disruption can 
render feasible an otherwise unfeasible free trade agreement, even if it had no effect 
on the political regime. If the agreement also plays a role in preventing disruption of 
the political system, the government’s incentives to sign the agreement are further 
enhanced (even though here we abstract from any ideological motivation the incum-
bent democratic government may have). We show this formally in Proposition 3 
in the Appendix.
Our results thus suggest that free trade agreements—especially those that are 
particularly effective in destroying rents—can be useful to prevent an authoritar-
ian threat. This can be especially important in fledgling democracies, given the 
 instability that typically follows the end of dictatorial regimes. We now turn to 
showing that these relationships are empirically robust.
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III. Empirical Strategy
The model has two main predictions about the relationship between FTAs and 
democracy, which imply the following hypotheses:
H1. Participation in FTAs lowers the probability of democratic failure.
H2. Unstable democracies are more likely to form FTAs.
To test H1, we define our dependent variable either as a dummy indicating whether 
democracy was interrupted or as the length of democratic spells. This allows us to 
estimate the probability that democracy will fail in the country, which we denote by 
Pr(enddemo) or simply P. We define democracy failure in different ways, based on 
either Polity IV data or on a dichotomous classification from Cheibub, Gandhi, and 
Vreeland (2010); we explain this in detail in Section IV. The key independent vari-
able is a measure of the intensity of the country’s participation in FTAs.
To test H2, our dependent variable is the change in a country’s FTA participation. 
The key independent variable is a measure of democratic instability that reflects the 
expectation that the democratic regime may fail in the country.
As indicated at the beginning of this paper, our problem is related to the one stud-
ied by Persson and Tabellini (2009), who examine the determinants (in particular 
the effect of income) of the stability of democracies and the impact of this perceived 
stability on income growth. Our empirical strategy resembles their approach.
A. Testing H1: Participation in FTAs and Democracy Survival
We estimate the likelihood of democratic failure relying on the concepts of 
domestic democratic capital (DOM) and foreign democratic capital (FOr) devel-
oped by Persson and Tabellini (2009), while adding a variable that captures the 
intensity of a country’s participation in FTAs. DOM is a measure of the democratic 
history of the country, whereas FOr measures current levels of democracy in the 
world.21 Other explanatory variables include economic factors (e.g. GDP per capita) 
and geographical and institutional factors (e.g. war indicators, continent of location 
and legal origin), denoted by vector Z.
Guided by our model, we consider only countries’ democratic spells. We estimate 
a discrete time duration analysis modeled as logit, which we implement as follows:
(17) log( P it /(1 −  P it ))
    =  α 0 +  α 1 FT A i, t−1 +  α 2 DO M i, t−1 +  α 3 FO r i, t−1 +  Z it β +  e it ,
where  P it denotes Pr(enddemo) for country i in year t and β is a coefficient vector 
for  Z it .
22
21 In the next section, we provide a precise definition of both variables.
22 An alternative to this logit specification would be a complementary loglog (cloglog) regression, where we 
treat the time interval as discrete or grouped by year. However, when the probability of positive outcomes is small 
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The variable FTA in equation (17) represents the extent (or the “intensity”) of 
a country’s participation in FTAs in a given year. Measuring the FTA intensity of 
a country is far from trivial. Despite a prolific literature on the consequences of 
preferential integration, that line of research offers no guidance on how to measure 
this intensity. In fact, most empirical regionalism papers simply use dummies to 
represent FTA participation. While this can be adequate for other purposes, such a 
measure is inappropriate here. Unlike other studies, where the unit of observation is 
a country dyad, we need a measure of FTA participation at the country level, since 
we want to estimate the endurance of democracy in individual countries. And defin-
ing participation in FTAs as a binary decision would not represent FTA engagement 
in a way that is even remotely related to what our model suggests. For example, 
every WTO member except Mongolia participates in at least one FTA, so there 
would not be any variation in such a measure in recent years. Using the analog of the 
dyadic dummies for the monadic case, i.e., the count of FTAs a country belongs to, 
would be similarly inadequate. The reason is the wide heterogeneity among FTAs. 
Some arrangements are fully implemented, but others are not, implying that prefer-
ences actually offered are few and small, and therefore entail little destruction of 
rents. Similarly, some agreements are very large (e.g., the EU), while others are 
tiny, including some that have many members (e.g., CARICOM). Even within a 
given FTA, the impact of the bloc can be very different on each member. Consider 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although it has had a large 
impact on Mexico, the smallest member, its effects are much less pronounced in 
the United States, the largest member. According to Proposition 2, only sufficiently 
rent-destructing FTAs have an effect on the sustainability of democracy. We clearly 
need, therefore, a more precise measure of the intensity of a country’s participation 
in FTAs than what FTA dummies offer.
In our model, where all sectors are symmetric, the extent of rent destruction within 
an FTA is given by the number of import-competing sectors included in the agreement. 
More generally, it also depends on the size of the export sectors of the FTA members 
relative to Home’s import-competing sectors. To capture both, we use, in our main 
regressions, the share of imports from FTA members. We recognize that this variable 
does not offer a precise measure of the extent to which FTAs destroy rents in each 
country; identifying empirically those sectors in every country is virtually impossible. 
However, the variable has the central virtue of varying monotonically with the degree 
of implementation of the agreement and with the impact of the agreement on the coun-
try in question. Consequently, it should be positively correlated also with the variable 
I  M from our model, which represents the extent to which import-competing sectors 
where lobbying happens are included in the  agreement. Hence, the import share from 
FTA members provides a useful proxy for the  country-level degree of rent destruction 
engendered by the FTAs a country belongs to. Compared with the alternative methods 
of measuring FTA participation used in the literature, which almost always rely on 
as in our case, where democratic failures account for only 2.2 percent of the sample (see Table 1), a cloglog link 
function is similar to a logistic link function. Since logistic regressions are more conventional than cloglog ones, we 
focus on the former. Results from cloglog regressions are similar.
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dummy variables, our method is more appropriate for our goals, because it varies with 
the extent and intensity of FTA.
Notice that our measure of FTA participation does not distinguish between trade 
integration that is deep but involves only a few (natural or large) trading partners and 
trade integration that is shallow but encompasses agreements with many partners. 
According to our theory, the distinction is immaterial as long as both cases lead to 
similar levels of rent destruction.23
We also need to take into account the possibility of duration dependence in (17), 
i.e., the extent to which the conditional hazard of democracy rises or falls over time. 
If there is duration dependence, the hazard of enddemo will depend on the duration 
of the democratic regime. In general, its effect can be either positive or negative. 
Domestic democratic capital will capture part of the duration dependence. For the 
residual duration dependence, we use a polynomial of a time counter that counts 
the number of years passed since the beginning of the current democratic spell. The 
order of the polynomial is determined by the best fit in the regressions.24 Including 
this duration polynomial, which we denote by Dur, we rewrite our estimating equa-
tion as
(18) log( P it /(1 −  P it ))
    =  α 0 +  α 1 FT A i, t−1 +  α 2 DO M i, t−1 +  α 3 FO r i, t−1 +  α 4 Dur +  Z it β +  e it .
A remaining concern in (18) is unobserved heterogeneity. It is possible that some 
countries are more likely to have interrupted democracies due to unobserved vari-
ables that are correlated with some right-hand side variables in (18). To deal with 
this possibility, we run a country random effects logit specification.25
Alternatively, we also use continuous time duration analysis for equation (18), 
defining the dependent variable as the duration of a democracy spell, i.e., the 
number of years passed since the onset of each democracy spell until it was inter-
rupted or right-censored.26 This variable is the same as the time counter we use 
for the duration dependence in the logit specifications. Hence the unit of analy-
sis here is a democratic spell. The duration dependence is specified parametrically 
(Weibull model) or nonparametrically (Cox proportional hazard model). In the 
Weibull model, the hazard function is h(t) = φexp( β ′ X t ) t  φ−1 , where φ is a shape 
23 We nevertheless investigate the robustness of our empirical results to an alternative measure of FTA partici-
pation that varies when a new agreement is formed but not when the depth or the breadth of existing agreements 
changes.
24 Using year dummies to account for duration dependence is not an appealing alternative for our analysis, since 
all the years without a democratic failure would be dropped from the sample, causing the loss of important cross-
sectional variation.
25 Acemoglu et al. (2008) highlight the importance of including country fixed effects when studying the effect 
of income on democracy. Unlike in that type of analysis, in our case a fixed effects logit procedure (i.e., condi-
tional logit) would be inappropriate because most countries do not experience democracy failure during our sample 
period. As a result, the observations for all long-lived regimes would be dropped, eliminating much of the cross-
sectional variation in the data that helps us to capture the effect of FTAs on democracy survival.
26 Since the Polity dataset can go as far back as 1800, we can determine the onset of the democratic spell even 
for most countries that have a democratic regime in the beginning of our sample (1960). In the few instances when 
this is not possible, we set the onset of the democratic spell to the first year for which 9 positive polity score is 
available.
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 parameter to be  estimated and t is the duration time. In the Cox model, the hazard is 
h(t) = h(0)exp( β ′ X t ), where the baseline hazard, h(0), is allowed to be group-specific.
B. Testing H2: Democracy Instability and FTA Formation
Once we have the predicted Pr(enddemo), we can use it to test our second hypoth-
esis, that the likelihood of democratic failure helps to explain the formation of FTAs. 
In the analysis we also include the economic, geographical, and institutional vari-
ables used in the duration regression as controls, except DOM, FOr, and the dura-
tion dependence terms. Nothing in our theory suggests that these variables should 
have an independent effect on the change of a country’s FTA participation, ΔFTA, 
in addition to their indirect effects on ΔFTA through Pr(enddemo). This is analo-
gous to the identification assumption of Persson and Tabellini (2009), that demo-
cratic capital affects income growth through their effects on the sustainability of 
democracy only. We also exclude the duration dependence terms. Instead, we use 
year dummies to capture time effects. In our context, the rationale to exclude FOr 
may not apply, because the level of democracy in a region could have an indepen-
dent effect on the likelihood that countries in the region will form FTAs. Thus, 
for robustness we also run a specification where we include in the ΔFTA regres-
sion DOM, FOr, and the duration dependence terms. In that case, we rely only on 
the nonlinearity of our regression to identify the parameters of interest. We include 
country fixed effects in all regressions.27
In line with our model, our dependent variable is the (change in the) import shares 
from FTA partners. Just as in the testing of H1, here too it would be inappropriate to 
use dummies, as is standard in the literature, to measure the intensity of a country’s 
FTA participation. First, because the analysis is at the country, not the dyad, level 
here as well. Second, even if we forced the analysis to be at the dyad level, the wide 
heterogeneity in FTAs discussed in the previous subsection would make the use of 
dummies rather inadequate for our purposes.
To test H2, we then run the following specification:
(19) ΔFT A it =  β 0 +  β 1  Pit +  β 2   Pit 2 +  β 3 FT A i, t−1 +  Z it γ +  a i +  a t +  e it .
In equation (19) we measure Pr(enddemo) with its predicted hazard rate evaluated 
at FT A t−1 = 0, which we denote by   P. We do so to eliminate the effect of FTAs on 
our measure of political instability (we already include FT A t−1 itself in (19)). We 
also include the squared term of   P to capture possible nonlinearities. Since   P is a 
constructed regressor, we adjust standard errors using bootstrapping methods. Our 
model predicts a positive impact of   P  on FTA formation.
27 Even though much has been written about regionalism, we still know relatively little about what makes gov-
ernments willing to form FTAs. Consider, for example, the seminal contribution by Baier and Bergstrand (2004). 
Most of the explanatory variables they consider are either geographical, which do not change over time, or “struc-
tural,” in the sense of changing little over time (e.g., factor endowments). Since we work with a panel, our fixed 
effects capture all of those fixed/almost fixed factors.
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Note that equation (19) is a standard dynamic panel data model, implying that 
standard fixed effects estimation will yield biased estimations of  β 3, but also of β 2  and of  β 1 , where our main interest lies. This problem should be rather mild in 
our context, however. The reason is that we have a long panel, which goes from 
1960 to 2007 (i.e., the number of periods in our panel is T = 48). As shown by 
Nickell (1981), the biases from using standard fixed effect estimation in dynamic 
panels decrease with T. Judson and Owen (1999), using a Monte Carlo analy-
sis, show, in particular, that estimation using the standard procedure is actually 
preferable to alternatives that take full account of the dynamic component of the 
panel if T = 30 (the longest panel they consider). Since we have T = 48 in our 
main specification, we follow the more standard approach, paralleling the speci-
fication adopted by Persson and Tabellini (2009) to estimate their growth equa-
tion. Nevertheless, we also report and discuss a dynamic panel estimation of H2 
in Section VIC.
C. Auxiliary Predictions
In addition to testing H1 and H2, we develop additional auxiliary predictions 
motivated by the model. Their goal is to help identify the mechanism behind the 
main empirical findings (or to rule out alternative ones).
Our main auxiliary predictions consider the type, or depth, of agreements. An 
unavoidable difficulty in any empirical analysis of regional trade agreements is 
that some of them represent little more than scraps of paper. We turn this problem 
to our favor, by examining whether our predictions hold similarly for the shal-
lowest arrangements. If the mechanism at work is indeed the destruction of rents, 
it should not.
To determine which agreements are ”shallow,” we follow a simple set of rules. 
First, we classify as free trade agreements all free trade areas and customs unions 
ratified under GATT’s Article XXIV, which we refer to as full-fledged free trade 
agreements (or FTAs, for brevity). The Article specifies minimum liberalization 
requirements that all preferential trade agreements have to satisfy. Developed coun-
tries must notify their agreements to the WTO under Article XXIV. Trading blocs 
formed only by developing economies can notify either under Article XXIV or under 
the Enabling Clause, which imposes much fewer constraints on what bloc members 
must accomplish. Accordingly, we consider agreements notified under the Enabling 
Clause—as well as those not notified to the WTO—to be partial-scope preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs, in short). This rule, while sensible, tends to overstate the 
number of PTAs relative to FTAs, because some developing countries may choose 
to notify the agreement under the Enabling Clause (to gain flexibility in their liber-
alization path) even when they intend to liberalize significantly vis-à-vis each other. 
To avoid this bias, we delved into the literature studying specific agreements to iden-
tify such cases. We identify three agreements—Mercosur, CAN, and ASEAN—that 
are notified under the Enabling Clause but have implementation rates comparable to 
several Article XXIV FTAs. Accordingly, we classify them as FTAs (this classifica-
tion does not have any qualitatively important effect on our estimates). We could not 
find studies providing similar evidence for other Enabling Clause PTAs.
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Thus, we test H1 and H2 for FTAs and for PTAs independently. If destruction 
of rents is a central force behind H1 and H2, they should hold among FTAs but not 
among PTAs.
To investigate whether the relationship behind H1 is driven by some other forces 
put forward in the literature, we also make the following empirical distinctions:
 (i) FTAs with more democratic partners and FTAs with other partners;
 (ii) participation in FTAs and participation in more general international 
organizations;
 (iii) FTAs that require members to be democratic and FTAs that do not have such 
a requirement.
The distinction in (i) allows us to potentially rule out FTAs that help to sustain 
democracies just because more democratic partners demand it. The distinction in 
(ii) permits us to rule out FTAs that help to sustain democracies just because of sig-
naling effects. The distinction in (iii) allows us to distinguish the political-economy 
forces behind FTAs from those stemming from institutional rules.
Similarly, to investigate whether the relationship behind H2 is driven by forces 
different from those we put forward, we identify empirically:
 (iv) countries that have recently gone through regime changes;
 (v) the volatility of democracy within countries’ democratic regimes;
 (vi) the intensity of political competition within a democratic regime.
The goal in each of these cases is to verify whether the formation of FTAs is driven 
by the expectation of regime change, as H2 indicates, or by some other plausible 
mechanism that may be correlated with our main independent variable.
We elaborate on these auxiliary predictions in Section VI, both on their ratio-
nale and on their empirical implementation. We also carry out additional robustness 
analysis, as we explain there.
IV. Data
We have a panel with 116 countries that have experienced democracy at some 
point during 1960–2007. Not every country is included because our study is 
restricted to democracies. In the online Appendix (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ornelas/
Liu&Ornelas_Appendices.pdf) we list the countries covered in our enddemo dura-
tion analysis. More than 200 countries are covered in the construction of our FTA 
measures, as explained below.
Data for the agreements come from the WTO website and also from information 
available in several other sources. In the online Appendix, we list the agreements in 
our dataset with their types (FTAs or PTAs) and other information about the data 
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sources. As discussed in the previous section, we proxy a country’s intensity of FTA 
participation by its imports from FTA partners as a share of its total imports in a 
given year. We use an analogous definition for PTA participation:
	 •	  FTA_impsh: a country’s imports from FTA partners as a share of its total 
imports;
	 •	 	PTA_impsh: a country’s imports from PTA partners as a share of its total 
imports.
As shown in Table 1, the average import share from PTAs in our sample is 0.06, 
compared to 0.21 for FTAs. We obtain the import data from the IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics. To construct the shares, we carefully consider the dates of the for-
mation of new blocs, of the accession of new members, and of the deactivation of 
existing blocs.
As we follow Persson and Tabellini’s (2009) general estimation strategy, our first 
definition of democracy failure follows their definition, which relies on Polity IV 
data (available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). This entails 
defining a regime as “democratic” if and only if its polity2 score (which ranges from 
−10 to 10, with higher values representing more democratic regimes) is strictly 
positive.28 In a democratic spell, enddemo is zero as long as democracy remains 
28 Countries enter the sample as they become independent, but only if they have a strictly positive polity2 score, 
since our study is restricted to democracies.
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max
enddem o it Dummy indicating the end of a democracy 0.022 0.145 0 1
FTA_imps h i, t−1 Lagged import share from FTA partners 0.214 0.282 0 0.920
PTA_imps h i, t−1 Lagged import share from PTA partners 0.063 0.128 0 0.698ΔFTA_imps h it Change in FTA_impsh from previous year 0.010 0.067 −0.451 0.761ΔPTA_imps h it Change in PTA_impsh from previous year 0.002 0.032 −0.442 0.502
log(GDP/capita ) i, t−1 Lagged log(GDP/capita) 8.004 1.522 4.400 10.632
DO M i, t−1 Lagged current domestic democratic capital 0.573 0.344 0 1
FO r i, t−1 Lagged foreign democratic capital 0.041 0.140 −0.217 0.261
wa r it Current war indicator 0.063 0.243 0 1
wa r i, t−1 Lagged war indicator 0.066 0.249 0 1
socialis t i Socialist legal origin dummy 0.109 0.312 0 1
Afric a i Africa dummy 0.169 0.375 0 1
Middleeas t i Middle East region dummy 0.032 0.176 0 1
Spain_colon y i UK colony dummy 0.189 0.391 0 1
uK_colon y i Spain colony dummy 0.307 0.461 0 1(M/GDP ) i, t−1 Lagged import/GDP 0.358 0.197 0.036 1.528
duratio n it Duration of democracy (number of years passed) 37.955 43.882 1 208
hazar d it Predicted hazard 0.025 0.038 0 0.386
enddemo0 5 it enddemo with stricter thresholds 0.019 0.136 0 1
enddemo6 4 it enddemo with stricter thresholds 0.011 0.102 0 1
FTA_impsh
 _moredem o i, t−1 
FTA_impsh with more democratic partners 0.056 0.165 0 0.899
Notes: The descriptive statistics of most of the variables in this table are based on the sample with 2,827 observa-
tions used in regressions (2)–(5) in Table 2, except for the last three variables, which are based on regressions (1) 
and (3) in Table 4 and the second regression in Table 6, respectively. Subscript i refers to country i and subscript t 
refers to year t.
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uninterrupted, and becomes unity when it ends. If a democracy does not end during 
our sample, enddemo is right-censored. There are 61 episodes of enddemo in our 
sample according to this definition (see the online Appendix for the list of episodes). 
For those transitions, the median score before the change is 4.8, whereas the median 
score after the change is −3.5; the median drop in the polity2 score is 8.8 points. A 
representative example of the median case of democracy failure is Thailand from 
1970 to 1971, when its polity score fell from 2 to −7.
We also use a different measure of democracy failure from a recent database 
developed by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010, available at https://netfiles.
uiuc.edu/cheibub/www/DD_page.html).29 Their measure has the advantage of 
offering a dichotomous classification of democracy/autocracy that yields a straight-
forward definition of the transitions—unlike the Polity index, where transition needs 
to be defined according to (necessarily) arbitrary thresholds. There are 44 cases of 
 enddemo in our sample according to this definition (see online Appendix).
Following Persson and Tabellini (2009), the construction of DOM and FOr is 
also based on polity2 scores. DOM is defined as
  DO M it = (1 − δ )   ∑ τ = 0 
τ = t− t 0 
  d i, t−τ  δ  τ ,
where δ is a discount factor and  d i, t−t is a dummy for a strictly positive polity2 score. 
The first positive dummy for each country is either the first year with a strictly posi-
tive polity2 score or the first year the country appears in the Polity dataset, which 
for some countries goes back to 1800. As Persson and Tabellini, we find that what 
really matters for democratic stability in DOM is current DOM (i.e., the current 
democratic spell), whereas the portion of DOM due to previous democratic spells 
is usually insignificant in the regressions. Accordingly, we use current DOM in all 
of our regressions, so  t 0 corresponds to the first year in which  d it = 1 in the current 
democratic spell. For the discount factor, we adopt δ = 0.95; results change little 
for δ ∈ [0.94, 0.99], the range considered by Person and Tabellini. In turn, FOr is 
defined as
 FO r it =  ∑ 
j ≠ i
 
 Polit y jt  ( 1 −  Dis t ij  _DEq  ) / N t ,
where Polit y jt is country j’s polity2 score at t (rescaled to the [−1, 1] interval), Dis t ij  
is the distance between the capitals of countries i and j, DEq is half the length of the 
equator, and  N t is the number of independent countries in the world at t. Thus, the 
closer a country is to other democracies, the greater its own stock of foreign capital.
GDP per capita data come from the World Development Indicators database. Data 
on wars come from the Correlates of War dataset and include all wars a country was 
involved in. Legal origin data are drawn from La Porta et al. (1999). Colonial his-
tory variables come from the CIA’s World Fact Book. WTO membership data come 
29 Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) extend the classification proposed initially by Alvarez et al. (1996).
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from the WTO website. Trade openness measures are obtained from the Penn World 
Table  6.3. The data used to calculate the number of international  organizations 
(IO) come from the database for International Governmental Organizations (IGO, 
v2.3).30 The data on formal military leader as chief executive are based on Gandhi 
and Przeworski (2006).31 Table 1 lists the definitions of all the variables used in the 
main regressions and provides descriptive statistics.
V. Empirical Results
A. Does Participation in FTAs Affect Democracy Survival?
We study first the impact of lagged FTA participation on the duration of democ-
racy. Table 2 shows the duration analysis results for five different specifications. 
The logit regression (1) uses only the FTA import share variable as a regressor. 
This variable alone explains around 7 percent of the variation in enddemo, as shown 
by the Pseudo  r 2 . In regression (2), we add all control variables and the duration 
dependence terms. It turns out that a second-order polynomial of the time counter 
produces the best fit of the model. In regression (3), we use country random effects, 
yet the LR test of the random effects (“ρ”) is insignificant at the 10 percent level and 
the changes in the estimated coefficients are overall quite small. Standard errors in 
those regressions are clustered at the country level. Columns 4 and 5 show results 
for the continuous time duration models, where the dependent variable measures the 
number of years passed since the onset of a democratic regime. Column 4 shows 
the coefficient estimates of the Weibull regression, whereas column 5 displays the 
coefficients of the PH Cox model.
In all 5 specifications, the coefficient of the FTA import share is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This result supports our first hypoth-
esis that greater participation in FTAs lowers the probability of democratic failure 
in a country. As for the control variables, GDP/capita, DOM, FOr, and uK colony 
dummy have a negative and statistically significant impact on enddemo, while the 
war dummy has the opposite effect. The estimated coefficients of the other variables 
are statistically insignificant.
Table  3 reports estimates when we use the Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s 
(2010) definition of democratic failure. Duration dependence terms are updated 
accordingly. Results are qualitatively very similar to those from Table 2, although 
the estimated coefficients are larger. This reinforces the evidence that more FTA 
participation tends to increase the longevity of democracies.
Are the estimates also economically significant? It is useful to interpret the 
coefficients in terms of marginal effects. Consider the logit regression result in 
column 2 of Table  3. The corresponding average marginal effect of FTA_impsh 
is 0.06. It implies that a 1 standard deviation increase in the FTA import share 
(0.282) would decrease the hazard of enddemo by about 1.7 percentage points 
(= 0.282 × 0.06 × 100), on average, which is about 67 percent of the average 
30 Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/IGOs/IGOv2.3.htm.
31 We thank James Raymond Vreeland for kindly sharing the data with us.
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 predicted hazard (2.5 p.p.). Compared with the variables Persson and Tabellini 
(2009) put forward as key determinants of democracy survival, this reduction is 
greater (in absolute terms) than that following a 1 standard deviation increase in 
foreign democratic capital (1.3 p.p.), though smaller than the corresponding figure 
for domestic democratic capital (8 p.p.). Or consider Mongolia, the only country 
without any FTA by 2010. According to the logit estimate, Mongolia’s hazard rate 
in 2005 would drop from 4.76 percent to 2.42 percent if it had the same FTA import 
share as Chile (FTA_impsh = 0.39 in 2005), or to just 0.4 percent, if Mongolia had 
the same FTA import share as Mexico (FTA_impsh = 0.72 in 2005).
Table 2—EnddEmo Regression Results Using Polity Data, FTAs
logit logit xtlogit Weibull PH Cox
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FTA_imps h i, t−1 −5.907*** −3.027** −3.131** −3.410** −2.938**(1.864) (1.335) (1.427) (1.381) (1.317)
log(GDP/capita ) i, t−1 −0.558*** −0.628*** −0.741*** −0.569***(0.150) (0.239) (0.153) (0.149)
DO M i, t−1 −11.935** −11.783 −17.830*** −71.748a(5.583) (8.839) (4.642) (0.000)
FO r i, t−1 −4.723*** −5.116*** −5.951*** −5.028***(1.569) (1.730) (1.607) (1.535)
wa r it 1.285* 1.297** 1.258* 0.972*(0.708) (0.643) (0.672) (0.545)
wa r i, t−1 −0.290 −0.323 −0.677 −0.292(0.689) (0.681) (0.701) (0.602)
socialis t i 0.256 0.395 0.270 0.201(0.587) (0.707) (0.621) (0.583)
Afric a i 0.395 0.456 0.050 0.270(0.406) (0.466) (0.359) (0.361)
Middleeas t i 0.255 0.347 0.978 0.444(1.190) (1.179) (0.895) (1.049)
Spain_colon y i −0.485 −0.470 −0.450 −0.451(0.486) (0.490) (0.471) (0.449)
uK_colon y i −1.216** −1.301** −1.233*** −1.229***(0.477) (0.507) (0.426) (0.406)
(M/GDP ) i, t−1 −0.032 −0.032 0.083 0.095(1.042) (0.890) (0.981) (0.914)
duratio n it 0.613** 0.631(0.260) (0.411)





Test ρ = 0 ( p-value) [0.323]
Pseudo  r 2 0.070 0.211 0.111
log Lik −309.2 −232.2 −232.1 −97.15 −235.4
Observations 3,008 2,827 2,827 2,827 2,827
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions.
a In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviation of DO M i,t−1 could not be estimated and 
was reported as a zero.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure  1 illustrates the magnitude of the effects. Using the specification from 
 column 2 of Table 2, we plot the estimated hazard against the share of imports that 
stem from FTA partners for Mercosur, South and East European countries. As the 
figure clearly shows, the hazards out of democracy drop sharply right after those 
countries become significantly engaged in FTAs.
In Table 4 we show that, when using the polity2 scores to define transition, the pre-
cise level of the threshold is not critical to our qualitative results. Surely, when defining 
Table 3—EnddEmo Regression Results Using Cheibub et al.’s (2010)  
Democracy Data, FTAs
logit logit xtlogit Weibull PH Cox
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FTA_imps h i,t−1 −8.144*** −4.963** −5.262* −4.912*** −3.986**(2.265) (1.930) (3.164) (1.804) (1.890)
log(GDP/capita ) i,t−1 −0.400* −0.441* −0.666*** −0.548***(0.209) (0.229) (0.223) (0.196)
DO M i,t−1 −2.040 −2.197 −3.374*** −1.437(1.292) (1.506) (1.137) (1.352)
FO r i,t−1 −5.566*** −5.800*** −7.117*** −6.184***(1.688) (1.908) (2.008) (1.996)
wa r it 0.772 0.744 1.069 1.387**(1.062) (0.816) (0.669) (0.646)
wa r i,t−1 −0.652 −0.622 −1.138* −1.426**(1.041) (0.872) (0.649) (0.659)
socialis t i −18.161 −15.061*** −44.731a(8,057) (0.875) (0.000)
Afric a i 1.334** 1.414** 1.555** 1.053*(0.654) (0.633) (0.687) (0.567)
Middleeas t i −18.281 −13.799*** −43.373a(16,401) (1.341) (0.000)
Spain_colon y i 0.741 0.764 0.919 0.393(0.531) (0.492) (0.596) (0.534)
uK_colon y i −0.833 −0.938 −1.134** −0.965*(0.517) (0.585) (0.557) (0.539)
(M/GDP ) i,t−1 −0.557 −0.572 0.418 0.053(1.491) (1.279) (1.136) (1.126)
duratio n it 0.132** 0.157*(0.062) (0.092)





Test ρ = 0 ( p-value) [0.255]
Pseudo  r 2 0.085 0.211 0.193
log Lik −248.1 −168.9 −168.8 −63.48 −116.0
Observations 3,279 2,122 2,484 2,396 2,396
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions. 
a In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviations of socialis t i and Middleeas t i could not 
be estimated and were reported as zeros.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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democracy failure by a move in the polity2 score from strictly positive to nonpositive, 
we may capture some very minor political changes (say a change in the score from 1 
to 0). Of course we also use the binary measure from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 
(2010), which is not open to this type of criticism, but it is nevertheless useful to check 
whether such marginal changes in democratic status are driving our results with the 
Polity data. In columns 1–3, we no longer classify as democracy failure the cases where 
the polity2 score drops by less than five points in the three years following the last 
year with a strictly positive polity score.32 In columns 4–6, we follow Mansfield and 
Pevehouse (2006) and set the threshold for democratic status at a higher level, 7, and 
again we classify as democracy failure only cases where there is a nontrivial drop (of at 
least 4 points) in the polity2 score. With both of these stricter definitions of democracy, 
the coefficient estimates remain statistically significant; they also become larger.
Table  5 shows in turn the results for partial-scope PTAs, using both Polity 
and Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s definitions of democratic transition. 
If the mechanism through which trade agreements help democracies to con-
solidate is the  destruction of protectionist rents, as proxied by countries’ FTA 
shares, then we should detect an effect of FTAs on democracy survival but 
not of PTAs. Indeed, when adding the PTA import share to the regression, 
32 Because the country random effects component in column (3) of Tables 2 and 3 are not significant, as shown 
by the estimated “ρ” and its p-values, we use logit without random effects in Table 4 and some of the other robust-
ness checks reported later.
Figure 1. Hazard Out of Democracy and Share of Imports from FTA Partners, Selected Countries
Notes: “FTA_impsh” denotes the share of the country’s imports that originates from FTA partners. “Hazard” is 
the hazard out of democracy, as explained in Section IV. The figure uses the estimates from column 2 of Table 2.
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its coefficient is always  statistically indistinguishable from zero (while the 
 coefficient on FTA_impsh hardly changes), confirming that partial, incom-
plete processes of preferential trade liberalization have no meaningful effect on 
democracy survival.33
33 If we run the enddemo regressions with PTA_impsh while dropping FTA_impsh, the estimates for 
PTA_impsh remain very similar—always statistically insignificant.
Table 4—Robustness Checks, EnddEmo Regressions with Stricter Thresholds
Enddemo05 Enddemo64
logit Weibull PH Cox logit Weibull PH Cox
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FTA_imps h i,t−1 −3.178** −3.653** −3.098** −5.408** −5.897*** −5.779***(1.445) (1.474) (1.385) (2.176) (2.155) (2.019)
log(GDP/capita ) i,t−1 −0.594*** −0.805*** −0.617*** −0.610** −0.923*** −0.708***(0.156) (0.164) (0.153) (0.247) (0.296) (0.266)
DO M i,t−1 −3.191 −17.027*** −71.045a −5.618 −18.986* −4.063(2.612) (4.712) (0.000) (6.142) (11.031) (5.836)
FO r i,t−1 −5.177*** −6.132*** −5.046*** −1.181 −2.661 −1.790(1.643) (1.680) (1.573) (3.116) (3.147) (3.069)
wa r it 1.790*** 1.762*** 1.470*** 0.954 0.780 0.340(0.588) (0.495) (0.415) (0.851) (0.972) (1.279)
wa r i,t−1 −0.678 −0.940* −0.541 0.948 0.662 1.955(0.556) (0.486) (0.437) (0.948) (0.841) (1.345)
socialis t i 0.399 0.309 0.220 −0.983 −0.735 −1.047(0.613) (0.679) (0.636) (0.939) (0.943) (0.989)
Afric a i 0.250 −0.021 0.210 −0.536 −0.703 −0.748(0.437) (0.403) (0.408) (0.652) (0.597) (0.611)
Middleeas t i 0.345 1.137 0.542 −14.263*** −44.358b(1.269) (0.938) (1.091) (1.108) (0.000)
Spain_colon y i −0.743 −0.878 −0.872* −2.861*** −2.628*** −3.266***(0.498) (0.549) (0.511) (0.867) (0.999) (1.050)
uK_colon y i −1.411*** −1.498*** −1.455*** −1.100 −1.488* −1.223(0.523) (0.481) (0.456) (0.759) (0.777) (0.808)
(M/GDP ) i,t−1 0.069 0.266 0.217 0.983 1.575 1.290(1.143) (1.145) (1.082) (1.434) (1.311) (1.357)
duratio n it 0.219* 0.389(0.126) (0.258)
duratio n it 
2 −0.004** −0.009*
(0.002) (0.005)
Pseudo  r 2 0.212 0.135 0.288 0.254
log Lik −207.2 −84.32 −192.5 −82.90 −33.90 −58.44
Observations 2,819 2,772 2,772 1,986 2,060 2,060
Notes: Regressions (1)–(3) consider only the cases of enddemo where the polity2 score transits from strictly posi-
tive to nonpositive and drops by at least 5 points within a 3-year window since the transition. Regressions (4)–(6) 
consider only the cases of enddemo where the polity2 score transits from 7 or higher to 6 or lower and drops by at 
least 4 points within a 3-year window since the transition. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by coun-
try in logit regressions. 
a  In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviation of DO M i,t−1 could not be estimated and was reported as a zero. 
b  In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviation of Middleeas t i could not be estimated and was reported as a zero.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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It is also possible that FTAs help to sustain democracies not because of their 
rent destruction effects, but because democratic countries demand democracy 
from their FTA partners. To test for this alternative mechanism, we define another 
FTA import share measure, FTA_impsh_moredemo, which is constructed just as 
FTA_impsh except that it covers only the imports from FTA partners with more 
democratic regimes, according to the polity2 scores. We add that variable to the 
regression to capture the additional effect that FTAs with more democratic coun-
tries may have on the political regime. If only the pressure from more democratic 
partners matters for the relationship, the coefficient on FTA_impsh_moredemo 
would be significant but not the coefficient on FTA_impsh. Table  6 shows the 
Table 5—EnddEmo Regression Results with Partial-Scope PTAs
Enddemo based on polity  “tta” based on Cheibub et al. (2010)
logit Weibull PH Cox logit Weibull PH Cox
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FTA_imps h i,t−1 −2.996** −3.418** −2.929** −5.159** −4.801*** −3.763**(1.327) (1.384) (1.315) (2.041) (1.770) (1.847)
PTA_imps h i,t−1 0.344 −0.199 0.121 −1.023 1.055 1.303(1.451) (1.373) (1.304) (1.649) (1.799) (1.539)
log(GDP/capita ) i,t−1 −0.557*** −0.743*** −0.567*** −0.402* −0.666*** −0.558***(0.151) (0.157) (0.148) (0.210) (0.224) (0.196)
DO M i,t−1 −12.089** −17.857*** −71.139a −2.066 −3.304*** −1.396(5.779) (4.694) (0.000) (1.334) (1.163) (1.330)
FO r i,t−1 −4.905*** −5.852*** −5.087*** −4.898*** −7.882*** −7.233***(1.512) (1.586) (1.536) (1.764) (2.020) (2.049)
wa r it 1.297* 1.250* 0.975* 0.755 1.085 1.409**(0.717) (0.673) (0.550) (1.050) (0.681) (0.683)
wa r i,t−1 −0.294 −0.674 −0.292 −0.645 −1.159* −1.465**(0.692) (0.697) (0.603) (1.033) (0.651) (0.682)
socialis t i 0.296 0.243 0.215 −13.479*** −37.490***(0.576) (0.647) (0.604) (0.895) (0.764)
Afric a i 0.411 0.040 0.277 1.279** 1.601** 1.134**(0.394) (0.367) (0.365) (0.634) (0.682) (0.571)
Middleeas t i 0.194 1.024 0.421 −12.589*** −37.624***(1.315) (0.979) (1.126) (1.394) (1.345)
Spain_colon y i −0.496 −0.445 −0.455 0.738 0.945 0.445(0.501) (0.476) (0.458) (0.534) (0.593) (0.530)
uK_colon y i −1.227*** −1.227*** −1.232*** −0.811 −1.160** −1.023**(0.465) (0.421) (0.403) (0.509) (0.545) (0.509)
(M/GDP ) i,t−1 −0.003 0.066 0.106 −0.685 0.549 0.230(1.085) (1.000) (0.938) (1.585) (1.212) (1.191)
duratio n it 0.619** 0.133**(0.268) (0.064)
duratio n it 
2 −0.009** −0.003**
(0.004) (0.001)
Pseudo  r 2 0.211 0.111 0.212 0.195
log Lik −232.2 −97.14 −235.4 −168.7 −63.29 −115.7
Observations 2,827 2,827 2,827 2,122 2,396 2,396
Notes: The dependent variable in regressions (1)–(3) is the enddemo measure based on the polity2 scores. The 
dependent variable in regressions (4)–(6) is the transition to autocracy (“tta”) measure from Cheibub et al. (2010). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions. 
a  In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviation of DO M i,t−1 could not be estimated and was reported as a zero.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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results. The results again indicate a sizable role of FTAs in sustaining democracy. 
However, there is no distinguishable additional effect from having the FTAs with 
more democratic partners. Thus, pressure from more democratic FTA partners is 
not a driver of our results.
Now, a potential problem in our analysis is the reverse causality between FTA par-
ticipation and Pr(enddemo). However, if our second hypothesis is valid (as we confirm 
to be the case in the next subsection), a greater risk of democratic failure would tend 
to induce more FTA participation. Without addressing this endogeneity issue, we find 
a negative effect of FTAs on enddemo. Had we eliminated it, the estimate would tend 
to be even more negative. In other words, the endogeneity problem biases the result 
against the hypothesis that FTAs reduce the risk of democratic failure.
Table 6—EnddEmo Regression Results, More Democratic FTAs vs. Less Democratic FTAs
logit logit xtlogit Weibull PH Cox
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FTA_imps h i,t−1 −7.803** −3.872** −4.013* −4.695** −3.785**(3.093) (1.918) (2.167) (2.038) (1.870)
FTA_impsh_moredem o i,t−1 3.901 1.696 1.779 2.748 1.739(2.545) (1.909) (2.778) (1.987) (1.883)
log(GDP/capita ) i,t−1 −0.564*** −0.627*** −0.748*** −0.575***(0.152) (0.240) (0.157) (0.151)
DO M i,t−1 −12.023** −11.877 −17.848*** −67.421a(5.606) (8.867) (4.623) (0.000)
FO r i,t−1 −4.802*** −5.144*** −6.122*** −5.106***(1.587) (1.723) (1.650) (1.550)
wa r it 1.282* 1.293** 1.261* 0.965*(0.706) (0.641) (0.680) (0.545)
wa r i,t−1 −0.286 −0.314 −0.670 −0.285(0.686) (0.679) (0.706) (0.601)
socialis t i 0.227 0.350 0.217 0.165(0.585) (0.707) (0.622) (0.584)
Afric a i 0.379 0.433 0.044 0.254(0.404) (0.460) (0.356) (0.359)
Middleeas t i 0.244 0.328 0.973 0.437(1.194) (1.175) (0.913) (1.054)
Spain_colon y i −0.489 −0.476 −0.460 −0.452(0.487) (0.486) (0.473) (0.451)
uK_colon y i −1.228*** −1.306** −1.279*** −1.238***(0.475) (0.507) (0.436) (0.405)
(M/GDP ) i,t−1 0.023 0.017 0.151 0.155(1.030) (0.885) (0.967) (0.905)
duratio n it 0.617** 0.633(0.261) (0.412)





Test ρ = 0 ( p-value) [0.342]
Pseudo  r 2 0.073 0.212 0.112
log Lik −307.6 −231.9 −231.8 −96.50 −235.0
Observations 2,989 2,823 2,823 2,823 2,823
Notes: FTA_impsh_moredemo covers only the FTA partners with more democratic regimes based on polity scores. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country in logit regressions. 
a In this PH Cox regression, the standard deviation of DO M i,t−1 could not be estimated and was reported as a zero.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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But we also address the endogeneity of FTA_impsh in the enddemo regressions 
formally. Although our specifications for the enddemo regression are all nonlinear, 
we now estimate it using a linear probability model (LPM), so that we can apply 
two-stage least squares (2SLS). Another benefit of LPM is that we can use country 
fixed effects in the enddemo regression without losing observations. To run 2SLS, we 
need instruments for FTA_impsh. Explaining the evolution of FTA formation over 
time is a notoriously difficult task, as most attempts to explain FTA formation rely on 
time invariant or structural country characteristics. We rely instead on a recent line 
of research that explores “contagion” effects: when neighbors of a country engage 
in FTAs, the country becomes more likely to do the same. Egger and Larch (2008) 
and Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012), using spatial econometric methods in a bilateral 
dataset, find strong evidence for contagion effects in FTA formation. We therefore 
construct our first instrument based on the contagion effects of FTA formation. We 
use bilateral data to construct the contagion measure at the country level, to fit into 
our country-year panel data analysis. We first calculate FTA_imps h it,−j for every 
country i that imports from country j in year t after excluding country i’s own FTA 
imports from j. contagio n jt of country j in year t is then calculated as the weighted 
average of FTA_imps h it,−j . We use different types of weights based on GD P it and 
distanc e ij , where distanc e ij is the great circle distance between i and j. We also use 
remoteness as instrument, defined as a country’s distance to the rest of the world 
(ROW) weighted by countries’ GDPs. As some authors (e.g., Baier and Bergstrand 
2004) argue, a country’s remoteness affects its propensity to engage in FTAs. Our 
presumption is that both contagion and remoteness affect countries’ likelihood of 
forming FTAs but have no direct effect on the stability of their democracies.
Table 7 shows the results. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
The first-stage regression results show that contagion is a strong instrument for 
FTA_impsh although remoteness is not. Together they are strong instruments as 
showed by the large joint F-statistics, which range from 14 to 36. An overidentifica-
tion test cannot reject the null that these instruments are valid. In the second-stage 
regressions, lagged FTA_impsh remains significant at either the 1 percent or the 
10 percent level. These results indicate that our finding that FTA participation helps 
to consolidate democracies is not driven by endogenous factors.
B. Are unstable Democracies More Likely to Seek Participation in FTAs?
We now turn to our second hypothesis. We use the predicted hazard rate from 
the duration analysis to estimate how democratic instability affects FTA formation. 
The hazard is predicted based on the first logit regression in Table 5, which includes 
both FTA and PTA import shares.34 As discussed in Section IV, to capture only 
the  portion of the hazard unaffected by trade agreements, we predict the hazard 
after setting FTA and PTA import shares to zero. The online Appendix displays a 
34 The second-stage ΔFTA regressions do not change in any qualitatively important way when we use the speci-
fications in Table 2. The same is true if we use Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland’s (2010) definition for transition to 
autocracy as the dependent variable in the first stage.
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 histogram of the predicted hazard, showing that it is below 15 percent for most of 
the observations in our sample.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table  8 display the regressions with the predicted haz-
ard, where the dependent variable is the change in the FTA import share from the 




























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FTA_imps h i,t−1 −0.187* −0.349* −0.729***(0.113) (0.203) (0.247)
log(GDP/capita ) i,t−1 0.014 −0.059*** 0.025 −0.053** 0.021 −0.038(0.039) (0.022) (0.041) (0.024) (0.038) (0.026)
DO M i,t−1 0.093 0.076* 0.110 0.100** 0.144 0.157***(0.120) (0.041) (0.122) (0.051) (0.113) (0.059)
FO r i,t−1 0.064 −0.170*** 0.227 −0.108 0.232 0.040(0.140) (0.056) (0.138) (0.079) (0.159) (0.086)
wa r it 0.026 0.035 0.026 0.039 0.025 0.047*(0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.028)
wa r i,t−1 0.002 −0.018 −0.000 −0.018 −0.003 −0.020(0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.023) (0.015) (0.025)
(M/GDP ) i,t−1 0.080 −0.041 0.102 −0.019 0.094 0.031(0.080) (0.044) (0.084) (0.051) (0.085) (0.058)
duratio n it −0.000 0.004*** 0.000 0.004*** −0.001 0.004***(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
duratio n it ^ 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000**(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
remotenes s it 0.461 0.357 −0.109(2.301) (2.337) (2.260)
contagion_ldis t i,t−1 63.304***(17.679)
contagio n it _lgdpldis t i,t−1 0.376**(0.166)
contagio n it _gdpdis t i,t−1 0.372**(0.178)
country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Partial  r 2 0.016 0.011 0.031




 r 2 0.363 0.350 0.353
Observations 2,827 2,825 2,827 2,825 2,827 2,825
Notes: We use the variables contagion and remoteness as instruments for FTA_impsh. remoteness is measured as a 
country’s distance to the rest of the world (ROW) weighted by countries’ GDP. In regressions (1)–(2), contagion is 
defined as the average FTA_impsh of all other countries (ROW) weighted by 1/log(distance) to the country in ques-
tion, after we exclude the country’s own FTA exports to ROW. In regressions (3)–(4), we proceed analogously but 
use log(GDP)/log(distance) as the weights in contagion. In regressions (5)–(6), we use GDP/distance as weights. 
Contagion variables are lagged by one year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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 previous year (ΔFTA). We also include the square of the predicted hazard to allow 
for possible nonlinear effects, as well as remoteness and contagion,35 as defined 
above. Year dummies are included to capture global trends in the formation of trade 
agreements. To control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, country fixed 
effects are also included in the regression. Since the hazard is predicted from the 
first stage with sampling errors, we use bootstrapping (500 replications) to adjust 
the standard errors.
In column 1, the coefficient of the predicted hazard rate is positive and significant 
at the 5 percent level, while its quadratic term is only marginally significant at the 
35 We report the results from the regressions using contagion with weights given by log(GDP/distance). Results 
are similar with the other weights used in the definition of contagion.
Table 8—Structural ΔFTA and ΔpTA Regression Results
ΔFTA_impsh ΔPTA_impsh
(1) (2) (3) (4)
hazar d it 0.337** 0.383*** −0.143 −0.107(0.152) (0.160) (0.091) (0.105)
hazar d it ^ 2 −0.766 −0.853 0.129 0.019(0.534) (0.543) (0.317) (0.309)
FTA_imps h i,t−1 −0.132*** −0.139***(0.018) (0.020)
PTA_imps h i,t−1 −0.103*** −0.111***(0.021) (0.024)
log(GDP/capita ) i,t−1 0.005 0.004 −0.004 −0.003(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
DO M i,t−1 0.008 −0.009(0.022) (0.010)
FO r i,t−1 0.179*** −0.032(0.071) (0.034)
wa r it −0.010 −0.011* 0.012*** 0.011***(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
wa r i,t−1 0.001 0.001 −0.003 −0.003(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
(M/GDP ) i,t−1 0.000 0.006 0.008 0.007(0.020) (0.019) (0.010) (0.009)
duratio n it −0.000 0.000(0.001) (0.000)
duratio n it ^ 2 0.000 −0.000*(0.000) (0.000)
remotenes s it −0.334 −0.789* −0.075 0.047(0.455) (0.475) (0.255) (0.290)
contagio n it _lgdpldis t i,t−1 1.046 0.575 −0.611** −0.548**(0.740) (0.689) (0.253) (0.262)
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within  r 2 0.118 0.121 0.098 0.101
Observations 2,826 2,826 2,826 2,826
Notes: Hazard is the predicted hazard based on the first enddemo logit regression in Table 5, 
after we set FTA_impsh = PTA_impsh = 0. Standard errors in the second stage are corrected 
by bootstrapping (500 replications).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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15 percent level. This result supports our theoretical prediction that unstable democ-
racies tend to form more FTAs than stable democracies. We can also quantify the 
magnitude of the effect. At the mean value of the hazard (0.025), a 1 standard devia-
tion increase in the hazard (0.038) would lead to about 1.3 percentage point increase 
in the FTA import share. Or consider, for example, the case of Guatemala from 1966 
to 1967, when its hazard shot up to 0.095 from 0.007. According to our estimates, 
this should lead to an increase of 2.3 percentage points in Guatemala’s FTA import 
share (the actual increase was 2.65 percentage points).
In column 2, we repeat the analysis from column 1 but include DOM, FOr, and 
duration dependence terms in the second-stage regression. The purpose of doing this 
is to check if our results are sensitive to these exclusion variables. The estimated 
coefficient of the hazard show little sensitivity to those changes.36
The last two columns of Table 8 report the results from the analogous exercise for 
the formation of partial-scope trade agreements, ΔPTAs. The effect of the hazard in 
this case is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, political instability has no 
identifiable effect on the formation of partial-scope trade agreements. This is consis-
tent with the mechanism we develop, where unstable democracies seek to diminish 
the rents available to those in power by increasing participation in FTAs—but not 
in PTAs.
C. robustness
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results along several dimensions. 
The accompanying tables are in the online Appendix.
First, we investigate whether our FTA import share variable captures mostly 
deepening of existing FTAs or the formation of new FTAs. Although the interpreta-
tion of the results is similar in both cases, it is useful to disentangle the two effects to 
check whether the formation of new FTAs matters on its own. To do so, we construct 
an alternative FTA import share measure (FTA_impsh60) by replacing current year 
imports with the imports in 1960, the first year in our sample. This measure excludes 
all variations in our main independent variable except those that come from the for-
mation of new FTA links. We find that doing so increases the magnitude of the FTA 
coefficients slightly, relative to their levels in Table 2.
Second, we investigate the role of the GATT/WTO in consolidating democra-
cies. The impact of FTAs on the availability of rents is subtle. Due to potential trade 
diversion effects, it is conceivable that FTAs may lead to the creation of rents, as 
some authors have argued; the role of our model is to show that, once one accounts 
for the endogeneity of the external tariffs, FTAs actually tend to destroy rents. By 
contrast, it is more straightforward to see that participation in multilateral trade 
agreements, such as the GATT/WTO, if it has any effect on the availability of pro-
tectionist rents, it must be a negative one. In light of our model, this should lower the 
risk of democratic breakdown.
36 We also tried both excluding DOM and the duration dependence terms while keeping FOr in the second 
stage. The results remain virtually unchanged.
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We therefore add a WTO membership dummy as an additional regressor to our 
existing enddemo regressions. The variable turns out to be highly insignificant. 
This may reflect the historically asymmetric treatment of developed and developing 
countries in the GATT. As Bagwell and Staiger (2012) point out, this asymmetry 
is codified in a set of “special and differential treatment” clauses that effectively 
exempted developing countries from making reciprocal tariff concessions under the 
GATT. This changed during the Uruguay Round (UR), which lasted from 1986 to 
1994. Since then, the requirements on liberalization at accession became consider-
ably more stringent. Subramanian and Wei (2007) show that, indeed, the change 
in accession rules matter: GATT/WTO membership does not have any discernible 
effect on the import levels of developing countries that joined before the UR, but 
has a positive and statistically significant effect for developing countries that joined 
since then. As in practice our hypotheses apply mainly to developing countries 
(most industrial countries display high levels of democratic capital throughout our 
sample period), it is therefore not surprising that a single GATT/WTO dummy vari-
able shows no relationship with democracy consolidation.
To find out whether that is indeed the reason behind the lack of statistically 
meaningful influence of GATT/WTO membership on democracy consolidation, we 
look at differential effects driven by the GATT institutional changes. Analogously 
to Subramanian and Wei (2007), we split the WTO membership dummy in two: 
WTO_ pre1990 equals 1 from the year a country joined the GATT as a formal mem-
ber provided that this happened before 1990; WTO_ from1990 equals 1 from the 
year a country joined the GATT/WTO since 1990.37 We find that the coefficient on 
WTO_ pre1990 is highly insignificant, whereas the coefficient on WTO_ from1990 
is negative and marginally significant at the 15 percent level. One may interpret these 
results as suggestive that GATT/WTO membership after the change in the accession 
requirements has a positive effect on the consolidation of democracies. However, a 
more cautious interpretation, to which we subscribe, is that reliable estimates just 
cannot be obtained due to the limited variation over time of GATT/WTO member-
ship. This is highlighted by the strict absence of cases in which a WTO member that 
joined since 1995 had its democratic system disrupted. As a result, if we use 1995 as 
the threshold for accession under the new criteria, the logit specification cannot esti-
mate the effect of being a “new” WTO member on the probability that democracy is 
disrupted, whereas the Weibull and Cox duration models provide implausibly large 
estimates. On the other hand, regardless of how we include GATT/WTO member-
ship in the regressions, the effect of FTA_impsh hardly changes.
Third, motivated by the findings of Pevehouse (2005) that participation in 
international organizations, broadly defined, can help democracies to endure, we 
also test whether the effects we find for FTAs are not capturing the effect of 
engagement in international organizations (IOs) more generally. This would mat-
ter, as the reasoning for the latter relies on signaling effects, whereas our empha-
sis is on a commitment to destroy protectionist rents. Fourth, Cheibub (2006) 
37 As Subramanian and Wei (2007) point out, the changes in the accession requirements happened during the 
Uruguay Round (1986–1994). They show that using any year between 1990 and 1994 as the threshold makes little 
difference for their results.
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shows that having a former military leader as the chief executive has a negative 
effect on democracy survival. This is confirmed by the extreme bound analysis 
in Gassebner, Lamla, and Vreeland (2013). Thus, we include the lagged num-
ber of IOs a country belongs to and a dummy variable indicating whether the 
executive leader is a former military officer. The estimated coefficient for formal 
military leader in the country is always statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
The coefficient on the IO variable is negative and significant in some specifica-
tions, indicating that engagement in IOs in general help democracies to endure. 
Nevertheless, introducing that variable has virtually no effect on our estimates of 
how FTA participation affects democracy survival.
Fifth, it is possible that our results are driven by a small number of observations 
for which alternative mechanisms may generate the same statistical association. For 
example, many previously socialist countries both established democratic regimes 
and entered in FTAs during the 1990s, but also went through many other economic 
and institutional changes. Are those countries alone responsible for our statistically 
significant coefficients? We check that by dropping all previously socialist states 
from our regressions. We find that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on our 
FTA variable is actually somewhat higher in the restricted sample. This probably 
reflects the fact that some socialist countries that became democracies later reverted 
to autocracies, despite effective participation in FTAs (e.g., Azerbaijan).
A related concern is that some trade agreements contain rules specifying 
that members must be democratic. This was a precondition for accession of the 
Central and Eastern European countries to the European Union. Mercosur added 
a similar clause for all of its members in 1998. For those countries, democracy 
and FTA participation must therefore be linked and this may have an impor-
tant effect on our estimations. Again, we find that the results are very similar 
to those from Table 2 when we drop the observations to which such rules apply 
(i.e., Central and Eastern European countries once they entered the EU and all 
Mercosur members since 1998).
Our democracy consolidation result could arise also because less rent-seeking 
democracies may be more likely to sign FTAs and may also last longer, relative to 
more rent-seeking democracies. This would imply that the results were driven by 
omission of a measure on how rent-seeking a country is. A measure for this vari-
able is generally very hard to find, but Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga (2009) 
provide estimates for how much governments care about general welfare relative to 
special interests for 54 countries/regions. Although the subset of countries is small 
relative to our sample, it provides a useful proxy. Including such a measure (1/b) 
in our enddemo regressions, we find that this variable is always highly insignificant, 
whereas the FTA_impsh variable remains significant in all regressions despite the 
sharp reduction in our sample.
Another possible omitted variable that may be correlated with our measure of 
FTA intensity is the country’s relative abundance of national resources. Ownership 
of natural resources in resource-rich countries tend to be concentrated in the hands 
of cohesive and politically strong oligarchs who benefit from international trade 
(and possibly also from participation in FTAs). But abundance in natural resources 
is also associated with higher rents and thus with the breakdown of democratic 
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regimes (see e.g., Wantchekon 2002). This suggests a potentially positive bias in 
our enddemo regression, so not including a measure of resource abundance may arti-
ficially dampen our estimates. We confirm this presumption when we add, in turn, 
a measure of resource abundance constructed by Albornoz, Galiani, and Heymann 
(2012) and the share of ores and metal in a country’s exports.
We also perform a number of robustness checks in our structural regressions.38 
First, does the hazard of democratic failure actually predict the formation of new 
FTAs, or just the deepening of existing FTAs? To eliminate variation in the depen-
dent variable that is unrelated to the formation of new FTA/PTA links, we repeat the 
regressions in Table 8 using the measure of FTA and PTA participation that consid-
ers 1960 import shares instead of lagged ones. The estimated coefficient on the haz-
ard falls but remains statistically significant at the 1 percent or the 5 percent level, 
confirming that democratic instability indeed helps to predict the formation of new 
FTAs (but not of new PTAs), as a more direct interpretation of our model suggests.
Second, is it really the expectation of regime change (proxied by the predicted 
hazard) that induces more FTAs? One alternative is that a recent change in regime, 
from autocracy to democracy, is what causes more FTAs. Another is that volatil-
ity in the degree of democracy has an effect on its own. Our estimated hazard 
may be correlated with both recent changes in political regime and the volatility 
of democracy. To test whether it is indeed the expectation of regime change that 
matters, we include in the ΔFTA regression, in addition to the predicted hazard, 
one of the following variables: (i) reg_change, a dummy indicating whether a 
country’s polity2 increased from a nonpositive to a strictly positive score, lagged 
by one year; and (ii) var(Polity)_10yr, the variance of  polity2 scores during the 
last ten years, which is used to capture recent regime instability. The first newly 
added variable is statistically significant but not the second. Most importantly, the 
estimated coefficient on the hazard remains positive and statistically significant. 
These results corroborate the idea that the expectation of a possible of democratic 
disruption matters for FTA formation.
Third, it is conceivable that our empirical results may be identifying a more gen-
eral phenomenon than the model suggests. For example, governments may form 
more FTAs as a consequence of general political competition within an electoral 
system, and not specifically because of the threat from autocrats. If the risk of dem-
ocratic collapse is positively associated with more political competition within a 
democracy, our finding that the threat of the democratic system induces FTA for-
mation may be driven by regular political competition within a democracy. To test 
for that, we include a measure of political competition in the ΔFTA regression. 
We use the variable POLcOMP from Polity IV, which codes the degree of politi-
cal  competition in the country.39 Again, the newly added variable is statistically 
38 Because the squared term of the predicted hazard is insignificant at the 10 percent level in our main regres-
sions (Table 8), we include only the level of the hazard in our robustness checks.
39 This variable measures both the regulation of participation and the competitiveness in the political process. 
According to the Polity IV Dataset User’s Manual, POLcOMP reaches its maximum score when “relatively stable 
and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion; 
ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups; and no significant 
groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.”
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 insignificant, while the predicted hazard remains statistically significant. This sug-
gests that regular political competition in a country is not an important driver of FTA 
formation, unlike the expectation of democratic disruption.
Fourth, negotiating and implementing an FTA is a process that can take several 
years. This suggests that the relationship may be stronger if we use longer lags for 
the explanatory variables and longer differences for ΔFTA. We do that by running 
the five-year difference in FTA_impsh on the same explanatory variables lagged 
by five years. Alternatively, we calculate first the 5-year moving averages of the 
variables, before taking their five-year lags or five-year differences. Please refer 
to the notes in the Appendix table for more details. When we take this longer time 
perspective, the estimated coefficient of the hazard remains significant and becomes 
considerably larger, as expected.
Finally, as mentioned in Section IV, equation (19) is a standard dynamic panel 
data model. Although this implies that our coefficients in Table 8 are estimated with 
a bias, the analysis of Judson and Owen (1999), among others, implies that the bias 
in our estimates should be relatively small given that our panel is very long. Still, it 
is worth investigating the robustness of our results to a formal dynamic panel esti-
mation. We report the results from four specifications analogous to those in Table 8, 
but where we use the two-step system GMM method, treating both the lagged 
FTA/PTA variables and the estimated hazard terms as endogenous. All specifi-
cations pass the autocorrelation and the overidentification tests. We find that the 
estimated coefficients of the key hazard terms are qualitatively equivalent to those 
obtained from our main specification.
Put together, these robustness checks boost confidence that we are capturing our 
intended mechanism, rather than the workings of some omitted variable that affects 
both FTA formation and political regimes in general.
VI. Conclusion
We study the relationship between a country’s participation in free trade agree-
ments and the sustainability of its democracy. We develop a model centered on the 
destruction of rents caused by FTAs. The model delivers two main results. First, 
deeper engagement in FTAs increases the longevity of democracies. Second, politi-
cal instability promotes FTA participation.
Relying on the concept of democratic capital developed by Persson and Tabellini 
(2009) to estimate countries’ hazards out of democracy, we test and confirm our two 
main predictions in a sample of 116 countries over almost 50 years. Our results sug-
gest that the rent destruction forces of FTAs constitute an important channel through 
which our predictions manifest. Our measure of FTA intensity is aimed at capturing 
those forces. Moreover, the predictions hold for “proper,” GATT 1947-compatible 
free trade areas and customs unions, but not for partial-scope agreements based on 
GATT’s Enabling Clause. We also find that the impact of FTAs on democracy sur-
vival is not greater when the partners are more democratic, so it is not simply that 
some countries demand democracy from their FTA partners. It is not that general 
political competition induces FTA formation either; it is the uncertainty related to 
the possibility of major changes in the political regime that matters.
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While all this is “good news” for democratic countries involved in FTAs, we must 
emphasize that participation in FTAs is, unsurprisingly, no panacea. They can help 
to consolidate democracies, but their reach is limited. Our estimates make this limit 
clear. The effect is nevertheless comparable to that of some of the main forces high-
lighted in the literature, such as the spread and strength of democracies in neighbor-
ing countries. Similarly, although we have found that democratic instability compels 
governments to engage in FTAs, there are as well many reasons other than demo-
cratic instability that also foster participation in FTAs.
Our study pushes forward a small but growing literature (largely in political sci-
ence) that seeks to uncover links between democracy and FTA participation. We 
depart from it by focusing on a specific mechanism—the destruction of rents in 
FTAs—that allows us to be more precise about the relationship. The paper also 
provides a clear departure from the perspective often taken by economists studying 
regionalism, who tend to focus on the strictly economic aspects of its causes and 
consequences.40 Purely economic motives certainly help, but cannot fully explain 
the intensity of the ongoing outbreak of free trade agreements, which have become 
the main trade policy instrument in many countries.41 We show that the instability of 
democracies is another important contributing factor to this trend. Yet much remains 
to be known about the interplay between trade agreements and democracy. We look 
forward to future research to further illuminate this relationship.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
We need to show first that  Γ ΔF D increases with ρ. Using (15), we have that




dρ  = δ [ W ΔF M (b) −  W ΔF M (b = 0) −  P r ΔF    _2  ] .
We know from Lemma 1 that P r ΔF   < 0 and that the welfare impact of 
an FTA is increasing in the rent-seeking bias of the government, so that 
 W ΔF M (b) −  W ΔF M (b = 0) > 0. Accordingly, expression (A1) is unambiguously 
 positive, so  Γ ΔF D increases as the probability of disruption rises. As a result, an 
FTA that is politically unfeasible when there is no chance of political disruption 
can become viable if the likelihood of political disruption is high enough. That 
is, an FTA that does not satisfy condition (15) can satisfy criterion (14) for suf-
ficiently high ρ.
To see how  I  M affects this result, it suffices to show that the probability of disrup-
tion, ρ, is a strategic complement of  I  M in the function  Γ ΔF D . Using the definition of 
40 A notable exception is the recent study by Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2012), who use the frequency of 
wars between two countries in the distant past to test whether FTAs lower the probability of war between them. 
They find that they do, especially when the trade gains associated with the FTA are high, indicating an interesting 
complementarity effect between trade and security gains from FTAs.
41 A figure in the online Appendix illustrates this trend. Indisputably, the number of free trade agreements in 
force has accelerated dramatically since the early 1990s. In the same figure we also show the cumulative number 
of transitions to democracy and transitions to autocracy throughout the world since 1948. The former trend has 
also intensified since the 1990s, but the opposite has happened with the latter, in line with what our results suggest.
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welfare aggregated across all nonnuméraire import sectors included in the agreement, 
we have that  W ΔF M (b) −  W ΔF M (b = 0) =  I  M [  W ΔF m (b) −  W ΔF m (b = 0) ] . Similarly, 
the FTA affects political rents only in the included sectors: P r ΔF =  I M ( P r ΔF m ) . 
Therefore, it follows that
   
 d  2 ( Γ ΔF D ) _
dρd I  M   = 2δ [ W ΔF m (b) −  W ΔF m (b = 0) −  P r ΔF m  _2  ] > 0.
Hence, the set of parameters under which the possibility of political disruption 
makes an FTA viable enlarges as  I  M increases.
On the other hand, the reverse cannot happen. If an FTA is politically viable when 
there is no chance of political disruption, it remains viable if a possibility of change 
in power through force arises. That is, an FTA that satisfies condition (15) also satis-
fies criterion (14) for any ρ > 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
In the absence of trade agreements, the authoritarian group attempts to take 
power through a coup if condition (11) is satisfied. With an FTA, a similar condition 
applies:
(A2)  [  W F M (b = 0) −  W F M (b) ] +  P r F 
   _
2
  >  1 − ρ(Dc)  _ρ(Dc)  K.
The difference between conditions (11) and (A2) is in the expressions’ left-hand 
sides, which denote the gains of the authoritarian group from getting power. On the 
other hand, the FTA impacts neither the probability of success of a coup nor the 
costs of a failed coup attempt. Subtracting the left-hand side of inequality (11) from 
the left-hand side of inequality (A2), we obtain
(A3)  [  W ΔF M (b = 0) −  W ΔF M (b) ] +  P r ΔF 
   _
2
  < 0,
where the negative sign follows directly from Lemma 1. Thus, if condition (11) is 
not satisfied, condition (16) will not be satisfied either, implying that an FTA cannot 
provoke a coup that otherwise would not occur. Conversely, condition (11) can be 
satisfied while condition (16) is not, implying that an FTA can be critical to prevent 
the authoritarian group from seeking power. Finally, note that the left-hand side of 
(A3) decreases with  I  M :
   
d[lhs(SS)] _
d I  M   =  [ W ΔF 
m





  < 0.
Thus, the range of parameters under which an FTA is pivotal in preventing the 
authoritarian threat is larger, the greater the number of nonnuméraire import-com-
peting sectors the FTA includes.
PROPOSITION 3: An FTA can become politically feasible by being pivotal to pre-
vent a coup.
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PROOF:
When an FTA cannot prevent the authoritarian group from seeking power through 
force, it is politically viable if  Γ ΔF D =  G ΔF   + δ[(1 − ρ) G ΔF   + ρ H ΔF   ] > 0. When 
the agreement reverses the decision of the authoritarian group, it is adopted by the 
democratic government if
   G F  + δ G F  >  G   + δ[(1 − ρ)G + ρH ],
where the left-hand side represents the present value of the government under the 
agreement (and no authoritarian threat) and the right-hand side corresponds to its 
expected present value without the FTA (and with the authoritarian threat). This 
condition can be rewritten as
(A4) (1 + δ) G ΔF   + δρ(G − H) > 0.
Now notice that the left-hand side of (A4) is greater than  Γ ΔF D if  G F   >  H F   ,which 
is true from the definitions of  G F   and  H F   , which are analogous to those in (6) and (7). Hence, even if  Γ ΔF D < 0, condition (A4) can be satisfied.
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